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1. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s have seen the oil producing states of the Arabian Pe-
ninsula under conflicting economic and political pressures. On the one
hand, declining oil revenues have ended an unprecedented economic
boom and forced a painful adjustment toward more sustainable levels of
growth. Business opportunities are less attractive than they were a few
years ago, and thus the oil producing states must work harder to attract
foreign expertise and investment. At the same time, however, Islamic
reaction and general political unrest in the Middle East exert increas-
ing pressure on these countries to adhere more closely to traditional
values as expressed in their ancient religious law, the Shar'a. Islamic
religious law is designed to regulate not only the religious and personal
life of the devout Muslim but commercial and political activities as
well.' The Sharl'a is not well understood in Western business circles.
The application of these ancient legal rules to complex commercial
transactions presents elements of risk and uncertainty that must be
weighed against the potential benefits of doing business in the area.
Nowhere are these conflicting pressures more evident than in
Saudi Arabia, the West's most important trading partner in the Middle
East and also the most conservative Arab state.' Saudi Arabia is now in
the process of developing rules for the arbitration and conciliation of
commercial disputes. The task facing the Saudi government is to give
the Western business community confidence that claims can be settled
(reasonably quickly and fairly, impartially and predictably) under rules
at least somewhat familiar to this community, while not straying too far
from the rules that historically governed arbitration, or tahkim, under
* Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C. J.D., 1986, University
of Pennsylvania Law School; Certificate in Islamic Studies and Islamic Law 1986,
University of Pennsylvania.
I SharPa means literally "a clear path to water." The definitions of all Arabic
terms used in the text are based on the works on Islamic Law cited in the text and on
my own reading in Arabic legal texts. Two Arabic-English dictionaries were used. E.
LANE, LANE'S ARABIc-ENGLISH LEXICON (1893); H. WEHR & J. COWAN, A Dic-
TIONARY OF MODERN STANDARD ARABIC (1976).
" See Saba, Saudi Arabia Investment Climate: Its Risks and Returns, MIDDLE E.
EXECUTIvE REP., Oct. 1986, at 9, 16-19.
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the Shari'a.
This article considers the question of how far the Saudis can safely
go to provide arbitration rules that meet the requirements of the West-
ern business community while still remaining faithful to the Saudis'
own legal tradition. The article initially discusses the various ways that
foreigners doing business in Saudi Arabia may settle disputes and fo-
cuses on the newly promulgated regulations and rules governing arbi-
tration in Saudi Arabia. It then describes the historical and conceptual
differences between arbitration as it developed in the West, and tahkim
as it developed in the Muslim world. The article concludes by propos-
ing an alternative approach to extrajudicial resolution of commercial
disputes in Saudi Arabia.
2. THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ARBITRATION
2.1. The Saudi Judicial System
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia represents an accomodation
between the political power' of the King and the religious authority of
the Shari'a and the Shari'a scholars, or 'Ularnd'. 4 The King has the
power to appoint judges, to resolve controversies over disputed points of
law, and to promulgate regulations in the interest of the Muslim com-
munity dealing with areas not treated by the Shari'a.5 The main check
on the King's power is the Sharl'a itself, to the extent that it provides
clear answers to legal questions, and the consensus of the 'Ularnf', who
advise the King as to the application of the Shari'a.'
3 See S. SOLAIM, CONSTrruTIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SAUDI ARABIA 80-132
(1970); Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, 16 IN'L L. 321, 321-37 (1982);
Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the
Shari'a to Regulate Development, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 413-53 (1979).
" Governing law in Saudi Arabia is the Shari'a as interpreted by the school
(MADHHAB)of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855). The teachings of a later Hanbali scholar,
Taqi Al-Din Abu- Al-'Abbis Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), are especially influential in gov-
erning circles. The three other recognized schools of law in SUNNI Islam are: the
Hanaff school founded by Abii Hanifa Nu'min Ibn Thabit (d. 767), prevalent today in
countries formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, including Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Leba-
non, Palestine, Eqypt, and Turkey; the Mliki school, founded by Malik Ibn Anas Al-
Asbaih (d. 795), influential in the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt, and prevalent else-
where in North Africa; and the Shifi'i school, founded by Muhammad Ibn IdrIs Al-
Shifi'i (d. 819), influential in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, prevalent in Paki-
stan and Indonesia. See S. MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' ri AL-ISLM 19-39
(F. Ziadeh trans. 1961); (PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM); S. SALEH,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 4-6 (1984).
5 These powers were outlined by legal counsel representing Saudi Arabia against
ARAMCO in the 1958 Arbitration. Asherman, supra note 3, at 327.
' Historically, the most successful Muslim governments have been those that were
able to work most effectively with the religious establishment, thereby maintaining a
sense among the populace that the state was being governed according to religious prin-
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The administration of justice is divided between the Shari'a courts
and governmental boards. The former are the only courts of original
jurisdiction, but cases that turn primarily on the interpretation of sup-
plemental regulatory statutes rather than Shari'a texts are usually re-
ferred to the appropriate governmental board for adjudication." Cases
headed by a governmental board include those where the Saudi govern-
ment is a party as well as most commercial disputes between private
parties where foreign parties are frequently involved. The governmen-
tal boards are bound to apply the Shari'a as well as the statutes, where
appropriate. The statutes are intended to supplement rather than mod-
ify the Shari'a, and are at least theoretically subordinate to it in cases of
conflict. The boards are made up of both Shari'a court judges and rep-
resentatives of government ministries. The Board of Grievances (Diwan
al-Mazlim) and the Committee for Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes (CSCD)a are the most important boards for litigation involving a
ciples. The Saudi ruling family has been very effective at integrating the 'Ulami' into
the decisionmaking process in order to insure political stability while still maintaining a
slow but steady pace of change.
7The statutes are intended to supplement rather than modify the Shari'a, and are
at least theoretically subordinate to it in cases of conflict. However, there is no record of
a statute being struck down by a court because of incompatibility with the Shari'a.
Occasionally the government will seek a fatwa, or legal opinion, from the 'Ulami' re-
garding the conformity of a proposed statute to Shari'a principles. Where a statute is
ambiguous, the law consulted by the courts is, of course, the Shari'a. As a practical
matter, the proper application of medieval Shari'a doctrines to modern commercial
transactions is often highly debatable, and this allows the government to claim consider-
able freedom of action with regard to commercial legislation.
Nevertheless, the influence of the Shari'a should not be underestimated by anyone
doing business in Saudi Arabia. A recent example of increased Shari'a influence in-
volves interest-bearing obligations to banks. Although agreements to pay interest are
contrary to the Shari'a and thus unenforceable, Saudi courts and administrative bodies
have in the past not looked too closely at transactions where an obligation to pay inter-
est was not obviously apparent. A recent change of policy has led judicial authorities to
place on plaintiffs the obligation of proving that promissory notes represent a repay-
ment of principal, rather than interest, in whole or in part. Renton, Saudi Arabia/ The
Settlement of Banking Disputes: Major Developments, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP.,
Feb. 1986, at 9, 24-25.
Moreover, Shari'a court judges reportedly have some degree of discretion as to
whether or not to refer a case to a governmental board, leaving some uncertainty as to
what tribunal will decide a particular case. See Vogel, Saudi Arabia/Decision No. 822
On Banking Deposits: An Analysis, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Apr. 1986, at 9, 21.
8 The Board of Grievances (Diwin al-Mazilim), established in 1955, has juris-
diction over all disputes in which the Saudi Government or a governmental agency is a
party. The Committee for Settlement of Commercial Disputes (CSCD) has had juris-
diction since 1967 over disputes involving companies organized under the Saudi Com-
panies Law. The CSCD consists of three judges, two of whom are Shari'a court judges,
the third being a legal advisor to the Ministry of Commerce. Most commercial disputes
between private parties are now decided either by the CSCD or some more specialized
government board, such as the Commercial Papers Committee, which deals with dis-
putes regarding negotiable instruments, or the legal committee established this year by
1987]
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foreign business.
Judges of both the Shar'a courts and the governmental boards
have a reputation for fairness and impartiality.9 However, there is a
serious backlog of cases, aggravated by a lack of sophisticated adminis-
trative support, as well as a lack of experience with complicated inter-
national transactions.10 In general, the legal system has not kept pace
with the modernization process. As a result, foreigners complain that
sophisticated financing is difficult if not impossible and that the security
of funds, goods, or technology advanced to a Saudi entity is inade-
quate."" For example, there are no clear definitions of liability for or
enforceability of insurance or maintenance obligations, patents or copy-
rights. Moreover, there is no clear right to repossess goods if a buyer or
lessee defaults; in fact, enforcement is still partly dependent on who the
debtor is."2 These problems have galvanized the search for an alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution.
2.2. Arbitration and Saudi Arabia
From the early days of oil exploration until the 1950s arbitration
was the primary means of resolving disputes between Saudi and foreign
companies.1 However, the Saudi government's attitude toward arbitra-
tion changed dramatically after the famous ARAMCO arbitration of
1958.14 As a result of its dissatisfaction with the decision in that case,
the Ministry of Commerce for settlement of disputes between banks and their custom-
ers. S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 133-41; Renton, supra note 7, at 25 n.1.
9 Cf S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 134-36, 140-41; Comment, supra note 3, at
441-42.
10 Hejailan, National Reports: Saudi Arabia, IV Y.B. COM. ARB. 162, 169
(1979).
1 Saba, supra note 2, at 18-19.
12 See id.
's For commentary on the arbitration climate in Saudi Arabia prior to 1983, see
generally A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, SAUDI BUSINESS AND LABOR LAW (1982); S.
SALEH, supra note 4, at 290-326; Hejailan, supra note 10, at 162-73.
14 The dispute resulted from a 1954 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Greek
shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, under which Onassis was granted a quasi-monop-
oly to transport oil out of Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO refused to comply with the Onassis
agreement, asserting that it had an absolute right under its 1933 concession agreement
with Saudi Arabia to choose the means for transportation of oil. ARAMCO's position
was upheld by an arbitral tribunal meeting in Geneva, which applied both Saudi and
international law. The Saudi government's dissatisfaction with the award cannot be
adequately explained merely by the fact that it lost, since the Onassis agreement was
not really very advantageous for Saudi Arabia. The dissatisfaction can perhaps be bet-
ter explained by more general Saudi concerns over the ability and willingness of foreign
arbitrators to apply Saudi law to disputes involving Saudi Arabia's most important
natural resource. In any event, Saudi law since the ARAMCO award has been hostile
to arbitration outside of Saudi Arabia or under non-Saudi law. See State of Saudi Ara-
bia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., reprinted in 27 I.L.R. 117; Van den Berg, National
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the Saudi government in 1963 forbade all government agencies from
resorting to arbitration without prior approval from the Council of
Ministers." This policy remains in effect today despite the 1980 Saudi
ratification of the International Convention for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Citizens of Another State (ICSID),
which provides for arbitration under the auspices of the World Bank.1
An ICSID arbitration clause has never been approved by the Council
of Ministers.
1 7
Commercial arbitration was not governed by a comprehensive set
of rules until 1983.18 As a result of this lack of clear procedures and
judicial support, arbitration between private parties has been sporadic.
For example, arbitration rules agreed on by the parties in advance were
not enforced and it was unclear how awards were to be enforced, espe-
Reports: Saudi Arabia, 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 7, 15 (1984).
15 A 1963 Council of Ministers resolution forbade government agencies from (1)
designating any foreign law to govern their relations with contracting parties; (2) ac-
cepting arbitration (anywhere) as a method of settling disputes; or (3) accepting the
jurisdiction of any foreign court or other judicial body to the exclusion of the Saudi
Grievance Board. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 of June 25, 1963, reprinted
in Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 15 [hereinafter Resolution]. For a discussion of
Resolution No. 58, see Hejailan, supra note 10, at 163.
16 The Saudi government ratified the ICSID Convention on June 7, 1980. Con-
vention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6690, 575 U.N.T.S. 160; see Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 15; see also Chaudhri &
Clodfelter, Saudi Arabia: Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom, MIDDLE E. EXEC-
UTIVE REP., July 1985, at 9.
17 Saudi ratification of ICSID "reserves the right of not submitting all questions
pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty" for arbitration or conciliation
under ICSID. See A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 181-82. In recent con-
tract negotiations, Saudi officials refused even to discuss including an ICSID arbitra-
tion clause. Saba, supra note 2, at 19; see also Chaudhri & Clodfelter, supra note 16,
at 20.
Saudi Arabia is not a party to the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, acceded to with reservations by
United States, Sept. 1, 1970, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6690, 575 U.N.T.S. 38. It
is, however, party to the 1952 Inter-Arab Convention on Enforcement of Judgments
and Awards. Convention of the Arab League of Nations Concerning the Enforcement
of Judgments, Sept. 15, 1952, English translation in 1952 REVUE iGYPrIENNE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 333-35. This latter convention has only six signatories and has
not been utilized much in practice. See S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 418-21.
18 The Saudi Arabia Commercial Court Regulation contained a few limited rules
on arbitration, allowing the court to confirm the appointment of arbitrators (but not to
appoint arbitrators should a party fail to do so) and requiring the court to review the
award prior to enforcement. Saudi Arabia Commercial Court Regulation, issued under
Royal Decree M/32 of 1/15/1350 A.H. (1931 A.D.). These rules did not recognize
the validity of an agreement to submit future disputes arising from a specific contract to
arbitration. Id. The rules were formally repealed in 1983, but had been seldom utilized
for some time prior.
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cially if they were rendered outside of Saudi Arabia. 9 These problems
were counterbalanced to some degree by the strong support for arbitra-
tion in the Saudi business community, whose members voluntarily com-
plied with most arbitration awards. Nonetheless, foreign companies and
their legal counsel were unhappy with the uncertain legal status of ar-
bitration. The Saudi government was dissatisfied also because arbitra-
tions were frequently conducted under foreign rules both inside and
outside of Saudi Arabia.20
3. THE ARBITRATION REGULATION OF 1983
The Arbitration Regulation of 1983 ("the Regulation") serves two
important objectives of the Saudi government. 2 First, it provides a
19 Awards rendered outside Saudi Arabia are still notoriously difficult to enforce
in Saudi Arabia. Saba, supra note 2, at 19. Foreign awards must be embodied in a
foreign judgment and even then are subjected to a de novo review procedure by the
Saudi government and/or a Saudi court of competent jurisdiction, which will apply
Saudi law to the substance of the dispute and perhaps review factual determinations as
well before enforcement is possible. Naturally, such procedures negate many of the
advantages of international arbitration.
Nonetheless, the arbitration facilities of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) have been utilized on more than 30 occasions since 1975 to settle business dis-
putes involving Saudi parties. Disputes submitted to arbitration under the auspices of
the ICC or other international bodies have usually been settled by the parties or re-
sulted in awards that were enforced voluntarily or enforced in countries other than
Saudi Arabia. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (1984); A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 197-
99.
Aside from the enforcement problem, other aspects of ICC arbitration are unsatis-
factory to both Saudi and foreign businesspeople. ICC procedures have been criticized
as procedurally cumbersome, time consuming, expensive, and overly confrontational.
Saba, supra note 2, at 19. For an overview and "horror stories" regarding ICC and
international arbitration, see Goekjian, ICC Arbitration From a Practitioner's Per-
spective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407 (1980); Kerr, International Arbitration Litiga-
tion, 1980 J.Bus.L. 164, 172; Layton, Commentary of International Arbitration as a
Dispute Settlement Vehicle, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Mar. 1984, at 26; Layton,
Is International Arbitration a Viable Option for Middle East Disputes, MIDDLE E.
EXECUTIVE REP., June 1983, at 14, 15; see also Flower, Killian, Northrup & Range,
A Survey of Arbitral Forums: Their Significance and Procedure, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 219 (1980) [hereinafter Flower & Killian]; Goekjian, ICC Arbitration
from a Practitioner's Perspective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407 (1980).
From the Saudi perspective, the ICC is viewed as a Western-oriented institution
insufficiently sensitive to Arab legal and business traditions. The Saudi government is
disturbed by the fact that non-Saudi law is frequently applied in ICC arbitrations to
resolve disputes arising in Saudi Arabia out of relationships created and regulated by
Saudi law. See N. ANGELL, PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON U.S.-ARAB COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 8-12 (1984); A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra
note 13, at 197-99.
20 See N. ANGELL, supra note 19, at 8-12; A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note
13, at 197-99.
21 Saudi Arabia Regulation on Arbitration, issued under Royal Decree M/46 of
7/12/1403 A.H. (Apr. 25, 1983 A.D.), reprinted in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 316-18 (1984)
[Vol. 9:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss2/3
ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION
comprehensive, uniform set of rules which are accessible to foreign
businesspersons and their legal counsel. The Regulation is designed to
allay their fears over the previous lack of judicial and legislative sup-
port for commercial arbitration.22 Second, it establishes governmental
control not only over arbitration procedure in general, but over the ac-
tual arbitration proceedings by providing for supervision by govern-
mental agencies, courts, or perhaps the Chambers of Commerce and
Industry2" ("the Chambers").
The extensive supervisory role played by the "Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute" ("the Authority") is perhaps the feature
which differentiates the Regulation from arbitration laws in other
countries.24 The Authority would presumably be the CSCD in most
commercial disputes;2 5 the Grievance Board in disputes with a govern-
ment agency that has received permission to arbitrate;" or the compe-
tent Sharl'a court in a case involving real estate.27 Representatives of
the Chambers, which promulgated their own arbitration rules in 1980,
argue that their organization also should be considered the Authority in
appropriate cases.28 The Saudi government has not officially com-
mented on the legal status of arbitration under the auspices of the
Chambers since issuing the Regulation.
Three aspects of the procedure established by the Regulation have
(implementing rules issued by Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7 of 8/9/1405
A.H. (May 27, 1985)) [hereinafter Royal Decree M/46]; see also S. SALEH, supra
note 4, at 4-6; Allam, Saudi Arabia/Arbitration in the Kingdom: The New Implemen-
tation Rules, MIDDLE E. Ex EcuTIvE REP., Aug. 1985, at 9; Van den Berg, supra
note 14, at 7-36. Translations of the Regulation and Rules are also appended to this
article.
2 See Allam, supra note 21, at 9; Chaudhri & Clodfelter, supra note 16, at 9.
IS Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, ch. 1, §§ 1-10; see also Allam, supra note
16, at 17.
11 "It distinguishes the Saudi Regulations from the arbitration regulations of most
other countries which seek to set up an entirely self-contained alternative to the usual
recourse to the courts of a particular country." Allam, supra note 21, at 17. "Such
ongoing involvement of a court is, of course, quite different from arbitral supervision in
other countries such as France." Chaudhri & Clodfelter, supra note 16, at 21.
" The CSCD is the presumed authority in this case, although it can be argued
that this is not the sole Authority. As a matter of legal theory, it can be argued that the
Chambers of Commerce and Industry can be considered the Authority. Allam, supra
note 21, at 17.
26 Id.
" Articles 5 and 6 of the Arbitration Regulation require that an "arbitration in-
strument" be filed with the appropriate Saudi Court. Royal Decree M/46, supra note
21. Where a case is not covered by statutory or contractual provisions, Shari'a proce-
dural and substantive laws apply to commercial contractual relationships. Chaudhri &
Clodfelter, supra note 16, at 20-21.
'3 Royal Decree M/6 of 4/22/1400 A.H. (Mar. 9, 1980 A.D.); see S. SALEH,
supra note 4, at 295-96; Allam, supra note 21, at 18-19.
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caused particular concern among foreign commentators.2 First, while
the Regulation recognizes the validity of a contractual clause calling for
arbitration of future disputes, it is not clear how such a clause is to be
enforced if one party refuses to cooperate when a dispute arises. Sec-
ond, commentators are unsure about the extent to which Saudi law
must be applied to the substance of the dispute. Third, the Regulation
does not specify the grounds on which the Authority may set aside or
refuse to execute an award.
3.1. Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses
The Regulation provides for two types of arbitration agreements:
parties may agree either "to arbitrate a specific existing dispute" or to
make a "prior agreement to arbitrate . . . any dispute resulting from
the performance of a specific contract."30 This recognition of the valid-
ity of an arbitration clause is confirmed in the Rules of Implementation
("the Rules").31 The binding effect of an arbitration clause is called
into question, by the requirement that the parties file an arbitration
"document" or "instrument" (wathiqat al-tahktm) with the Authority
for validation when a dispute arises.32 This instrument must contain
the names of the arbitrator(s) and their acceptance to hear the dispute
and details of the dispute itself, and it must be signed by both parties.33
It is unclear, however, what happens if a party, having agreed in
advance to arbitration of any disputes arising from a specific contract,
refuses to cooperate in the preparation of an arbitration instrument
when a dispute actually arises. Commentators on the Regulation and
Rules conclude - from the requirement that disputes subject either to
an arbitration clause (future disputes) or an arbitration instru-
ment-dealing with a specific existing dispute "be heard only according
to the provisions of this Regulation," and from other Articles which
link various time limits and other events, including the issuance of the
award, to the arbitration instrument - that an arbitration instrument
is obligatory in all cases.3" The Rules appear to confirm the obligatory
nature of an arbitration instrument, distinguishing between an agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes (arbitration clause) and the appoint-
ment of arbitrators, which "shall be completed by agreement between
the disputing parties in an arbitration instrument which shall suffi-
39 See infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
:0 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 1.
SI Id. rules of implementation § 6.
32 Id. art. 5.
S Id.
" Id. arts. 7, 9, 11, 17, 22.
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ciently outline the dispute and the names of the arbitrators." 5 Com-
mentators have reached different conclusions regarding the legal effect,
by itself, of an agreement to arbitrate future disputes.3 6
Additional confusion is created by the Rules, which state that an
arbitration panel may render a default judgment if one party does not
appear at the first hearing, "as long as the respective parties have filed
their statements of claim, defenses and documentation.13 7 If a party has
not cooperated in any stage of the proceedings, including the filing of
such statements, it is unclear whether a default judgment can still be
issued.
This apparent confusion in drafting must be taken seriously by the
Western business community in light of the unenforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses under prior Saudi law and the serious questions concerning
the validity of agreements to arbitrate future disputes under the
Sharl'a. At the very least, it is safe to conclude that there is enough
ambiguity in the statute to create opportunities for a party to delay the
proceedings. The Rules state that the Authority "shall issue a decision
for approval of the arbitration instrument within fifteen days."3 " How-
ever, the Rules do not state any consequences if the Authority fails to
respect this time limit, which seems unreasonable (and probably inap-
plicable) if the arbitration instrument does not contain all the informa-
tion required. Assuming the Authority would have power to appoint an
35 Id. rules of implementation § 6.
3s One commentator takes the view that there can be no arbitration on the basis of
an arbitration law, where an arbitration clause is merely a promise to agree to submit
any future dispute to arbitration, although it does have the effect of staying judicial
proceedings. Courts in Lebanon can order a party to sign a submission agreement, and,
if the party refuses, can render judgment on the merits in favor of the other party. No
such sanctions are available in the Regulation, leading the commentator to term the
recognition of arbitration clauses in Article I "rather platonic," and to argue that it
cannot be said with certainty to constitute more than a definition of an arbitration
clause. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 304-07.
Other commentators argue that provisions of Article 10 stating "[i]f the parties
have not appointed the arbitrators, or if either of them fails to appoint his arbitrator(s)
... the Authority. . . shall appoint the required arbitrators upon request of the party
who is interested in expediting the arbitration" would be meaningless except in the
context of an enforceable arbitration clause, since an arbitration instrument would in-
clude the appointment of arbitrators and their acceptance to serve. Van den Berg,
supra note 14, at 11-12.
Still another commentator suggests, on the basis of "informal conversations" with
Saudi government officials, that the proper procedure when a party has signed an arbi-
tration clause, but refuses to sign an arbitration instrument, would be for the other
party to submit an arbitration instrument containing as much as possible of the infor-
mation required in Article 5, coupled with a request that the Authority exercise its
Article 10 power to appoint any missing arbitrators and that it validate the arbitration
instrument at the same time. Allam, supra note 21, at 16, 18 n.10.
3 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 18.
S Id. § 7.
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arbitrator in such a case, the Authority would be required to provide
notice and a hearing on the appointment of arbitrators. 9 The party
seeking to avoid arbitration would then have a chance to present argu-
ments regarding the validity of the arbitration clause and its applicabil-
ity to the dispute in question, and possibly to haggle over various as-
pects of the arbitration instrument, such as the "details" of the
dispute.
40
3.2. Applicable Law
The Regulation and Rules contain numerous features apparently
designed to insure that arbitrators comply with the Sharia and applica-
ble Saudi statutes in deciding the merits of a case. The Rules specify
that arbitrators must be Muslim, though they need not be Saudi na-
tionals.41 The arbitrators are expected to issue an award that is valid
and enforceable under "provisions of the Islamic Shari'a and applicable
regulations." 42 The Authority acts as secretary to the arbitration panel,
handling all "notifications and notices," and is thus in a position to
monitor the proceedings.4 3 Arbitrators' fees not paid by the parties to
the arbitrators within five days of approval of the arbitration instru-
ment are to be paid to the Authority and held in escrow. The fees are
then payable to the arbitrators only after the Authority issues an order
for execution of the award.44 This arrangement in itself would seem to
be a strong incentive for arbitrators to make sure that awards comply
strictly with Saudi substantive law so that the Authority's review of the
award will not be unduly prolonged.
One commentator suggests that foreign legal principles might be
applied as long as they are not contrary to Saudi public policy as ex-
pressed in provisions of the Sharia and the statutes."5 In light of the
aforementioned provisions of the Regulation and Rules and the diffi-
, Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 10.
40 Provided there is an arbitration clause that appears valid on its face, most arbi-
tration rules in widespread use internationally leave more detailed inquiry into the
arbitration clause's validity and applicability, as well as the drafting of terms of refer-
ence (details of the dispute), to the arbitrators, with possibility of review by a court or
supervisory body after the award is rendered. See generally Flower & Killian, supra
note 19 (comparison of arbitral forums).
41 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 3; see also Al-
lam, supra note 21, at 9, 18 n.3 (theorizing that the government employee need not be
Muslim, though the need for knowledge of Shari'a would make such a situation un-
likely to occur).
42 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, rules of implementation § 39.
43 Id. art. 8.
44 Id. art. 22.
"5 Allam, supra note 21, at 9, 15-16.
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culty of determining what does or does not constitute "public policy" in
any legal system, it would seem risky for an arbitrator to disregard a
provision of the Sharl'a or the statutes on the basis that such a provi-
sion does not rise to the level of public policy. Public policy is not a
term used anywhere in the Regulation or Rules.
Possible intervention by the Authority after arbitration proceed-
ings have begun could occur for the purpose of replacing arbitrators or
hearing challenges to arbitrators.'8 Under the Rules, preliminary issues
involving matters outside the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel, in-
cluding, but apparently not limited to, allegations of forgery or other
criminal wrongdoing, require that arbitration proceedings be suspended
pending final decision on the issue by "the concerned authority.'
4
7
3.3. Enforceability of the Award
Once an award is rendered, the Authority is required to hear any
objection against it;48 however, even if there is no objection to the
award, the Regulation still prevents the Authority from issuing an en-
forcement order before confirming "that there is nothing to prevent [the
award's] execution legally."'" The word "legally" is a translation of the
Arabic shar'an, which means literally, "according to the Sharia."
There is nothing in the Regulation or Rules to limit the scope of review
by the Authority. It is not clear whether any subsequent appeal to a
higher authority could be made if an objection were dismissed by the
authority with original jurisdiction. However, if the Authority is the
CSCD, a judgment would normally be appealable to the Ministry of
Commerce. 50 This procedure is in marked contrast to the arbitration
laws of other countries that limit the grounds on which a court can
deny execution of an arbitral award. 51 Such grounds normally include
4' Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 10, 12.
47 Id. rules of implementation § 37.
48 Id. art. 19.
49 Id. art. 20.
"' See Allam, supra note 21, at 17 (discussing whether any organization other
than CSCD could constitute the Authority). One can usually file an appeal of a CSCD
decision with the Minister of Commerce, but it is unclear whether such a procedure is
also available for one objecting to a decision by the Authority. See id. at 19 n.19
("[Tihe Regulations seek to establish a homogeneous and essentially independent set of
Arbitration Regulations and the CSCD is acting itself in an appellate capacity. It may
then be argued that such appeal to the Minister of Commerce is not available since it is
not specifically mentioned in the Regulations."); see also Van den Berg, supra note 14,
at 32.
" See Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33. For example, the 1958 New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to which
sixty-six nations (although not Saudi Arabia, see supra note 17) are contracting states,
limits the grounds for refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards. New York Convention
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lack of impartiality of the arbitrator; failure to give a party a fair hear-
ing; an arbitrator exceeding his authority; a violation of some provision.
in a statute or in the parties' agreement concerning arbitration proce-
dure or composition of the arbitral tribunal; or a violation of public
policy. 2 Usually only one appeal is allowed from the award in other
countries.
5 3
4. ARBITRATION AND TANKIM
As noted above, problems in the arbitration process include: the
ambiguities in the Regulation and Rules regarding the binding effect of
arbitration clauses, the law that may be applied to the substance of the
dispute, and the difference in the scope of judicial review of arbitration
between the West and the Muslim jurists' interpretation of what they
called tahkim. The following sections discuss why binding arbitration
clauses, choice of law by the parties, and limited judicial review of
awards are central to the Western concept of arbitration and to the
usefulness of arbitration in resolving international business disputes.
They then discuss why these three characteristics may be problematic
for a Muslim jurist. Reference will be made first to the early history of
Islam and the primary sources of the Shari'a (the Qur'an, or revealed
word of God, and the Sunna, or practice of the Prophet Muhammad)
and second to the derived sources of the Shart'a (Qiyds, or analogy to
the revealed sources, and Ijma', or consensus of legal scholars of the
past regarding points of law).
4.1. Arbitration in the Western Legal Tradition
Arbitration in the West has always been a parallel system of jus-
tice operating outside of the existing court system and its rules of sub-
stantive and procedural law.5 Aristotle emphasized this distinction very
early: "Parties may prefer arbitration rather than a judicial action, for
an arbitrator will look at equity, whilst a court has to consider the
law."' 55 To fill this equitable role effectively, arbitration had to be insu-
lated from undue interference by the courts, even where court coopera-
on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V,
para. 2, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
:' Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33.
3 Cf Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33 (referring to the stated grounds of
appeal of other countries, and remarking that these countries do not review the merits
of an arbitral award).
"' See R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 13 (1985). For his-
torical data and general observations about national law in the West, see generally id.
5' See id. at 19 (quoting Aristotle).
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tion was needed to insure enforcement of arbitral decisions.56
Roman law insulated arbitration from court interference by con-
fining it to the realm of contract law and prohibiting court review in
most cases.57 Late medieval jurists recognized that minimal court re-
view of awards was necessary and they severely restricted its scope.58
Judges were not permitted to overturn an arbitrator's decision merely
because it was contrary to law (injusta) but only if it was contrary to
equity (iniqua), that is, unacceptable to an honest, reasonable person,
such that it would be contrary to good faith to accept it. 9
Although the ancient distinctions between law and equity are no
longer of much practical significance, there has been a continuing need
for dispute resolution procedures that are more flexible and more
closely attuned to business needs than those applied by national courts.
The business community today uses arbitration for a variety of reasons
" See Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 33 ("In the majority of other countries a
court will not review the merits of an award as arbitration is conceived as a contractual
substitute for litigation. Where parties have expressed the will that their dispute be
solved by arbitration instead of the courts, such will should be honoured by the
courts.").
17 R. DAVID, supra note 54, at 85. Under Roman Law, a dispute could be sub-
mitted to arbitration by a separate agreement, not included in a larger contract. Such
an agreement (arbitration ex compromisso) would not be specifically enforced by the
courts because it was not one of the contractual forms recognized by law. Courts would,
however, enforce an agreement stating that a party who refused to submit to arbitration
or refused to comply with the arbiter's decision would pay the other party a penalty
(poena). The enforcement of such a penalty did not entail any ruling as to whether or
not the arbiter's decision was in compliance with the law. Another type of arbitration
agreement could be included as a term in a contract. In this way, parties to certain
"consensual" contracts in which a particularly strong duty of good faith (bona fides)
was imposed, could agree to remit the determination of certain clauses in the contract to
an arbitrator. Known as arbitration boni viri, this method could be used, for example,
to determine the sum due a partner in a partnership. Decisions reached through this
type of arbitration would be specifically enforced by a judge, even if contrary to law.
Enforcement would be refused only if the decision was manifestly unjust, that is, if the
arbitrator had not acted in good faith. See id. at 84-85.
8 Both types of arbitration known to Roman law were revived in the Middle
Ages. Arbitration ex compromisso in particular increasingly assumed the characteristics
of judicial procedure. Certain towns, fairs, merchants' guilds, and corporations were
granted charters that empowered them, among other things, to organize and administer
their own justice. The tribunals thus established were called arbitral, even though they
had compulsory jurisdiction over certain disputes, partly because parties had a limited
ability to choose their own judges, but primarily because the tribunals did not apply the
rules of local customary law; rather, they developed their own commercial law, the law
merchant. Id. at 85-86. Arbitration boni viri attracted the interest of canon lawyers,
who widened its scope of application by imposing a duty of "good faith" in all contrac-
tual relationships. The arbitrator, also known as an amicabilis compositor, was em-
powered at first only to propose a compromise solution acceptable to both parties.
Later, however he was authorized to impose his decision. Id. at 86-87.
59 Id. at 88.
1987]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
that one author has recently summarized under four headings: 0
(1) Arbitration is viewed as a means of improving the administra-
tion of justice by reducing the procedural formalism, delay, and cost
inherent in litigation and allowing disputes to be decided by persons
better informed than judges with regard both to commercial usages in
general and to technical aspects of particular disputes.
(2) Arbitration is viewed as a means for developing rules of sub-
stantive law more appropriate to the needs of the business community
than those applied by courts. The role of arbitration in developing an
international law merchant is particularly stressed by some authors.6,
(3) Arbitration may be an effective method of finding compromise
solutions that take into account the interests of parties on both sides of
a dispute, thus minimizing resentment and conflict and allowing busi-
ness relationships to continue even in circumstances where the parties
cannot agree to a solution of their dispute through conciliation, and
where a court judgment might result in dissolution of the contractual
relationship.
(4) Arbitration may be used to resolve disputes that do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the courts. Arbitrators may be called upon to
revise or modify long-term contracts or to fill gaps left intentionally or
unintentionally by the parties, thus giving the contract more flexibility
to adapt to changed circumstances that might otherwise result in rescis-
sion of the contract and an award of damages.
National legislation in countries influenced directly or indirectly
by Roman law takes a variety of approaches in formulating rules that
allow arbitration the flexibility to fulfill this wide range of roles while
still permitting access to the courts for enforcement purposes. Civil law
countries tend to maintain a distinction between two types of arbitra-
tion, allowing the parties to authorize their arbitrator to decide a dis-
pute either in strict law or ex aequo et bono, in an equitable fashion."2
Different standards of review may apply depending on which type of
arbitration is chosen.6" In common law countries, no such distinction is
60 See id. at 10-27.
61 See, e.g., Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Develop-
ment of Business Law, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 526, 526-34 (1983). For an assessment of
the impact of the international lex mercatoria doctrine, see Klein, The Law to be Ap-
plied by the Arbitrators to the Substance of the Dispute, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION
189-206 (J. Schultsz & A. Van den Berg eds. 1982).
82 This distinction in types of arbitration arises from Roman law. R. DAVID,
supra note 54, at 87-88. For an explanation of how the distinction continues in French
law, see id. at 84, 88-90. For a discussion of the distinction's function in Italian law,
see id. at 92.
83 See id. at 87 ("An amicable compositeur was not bound to decide in accordance
with the law, since he was regarded, fundamentally, as a conciliator; but his decision
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explicitly recognized.6" However, courts will generally afford great def-
erence to arbitral decisions, recognizing at least tacitly that businessper-
sons do not expect arbitrators to decide disputes in exactly the same
way judges do. In the United States, for example:
arbitrators pay the greatest attention to the legal arguments
developed before them, but they do not hesitate to depart
from strict law if this is required by justice. In so doing they
believe they are fulfilling the will of the parties: businessmen
prefer the way in which facts are interpreted by arbitrators
to the uncertainty which, in their opinion, is inherent in the
methods of interpretation used by courts or juries who are
ignorant of the problems and conventions of trade.65
When arbitration has been fettered by rules making it too similar
to litigation, frequently an institutional change has taken place. In It-
aly, for example, "free" or "informal" arbitration (arbitrato liberale)
has largely replaced arbitration in strict law which is governed by pro-
visions of the Code of Civil Procedure.6" In England, the Arbitration
Act of 197967 severely limits the authority formerly possessed by the
courts to review arbitration awards on their legal merits, at least where
the dispute is of an international character. The Act was a response to
the reluctance of many businessmen to choose England or English law
for arbitration of complex international disputes.6 '
Judicial deference to the parties' choice of strict law or equity and
deference to the decision of the arbitrator chosen by them, or at least
could be quashed if it were contrary to equity (iniqua). There was on the other hand a
tendency to ... consider ... that an arbiter ex compromisso was bound to decide as a
judge.")
6 Id. at 107 ("whilst on the continent of Europe a distinction is made between
the arbitrator at law and the amicable compositeur, such a distinction, regarding sub-
stantive law, is unknown in common law countries."). In socialist countries, as well as
in England, only one type of arbitration exists. Id. at 124.
05 See id. at 120. As one commentator has noted, "American businessmen believe
that lawyers and judges are, after all, amateurs in the matter of commercial disputes.
Lawyers and judges require evidence to be produced on matters which are regarded as
self-evident by a tradesman, they search for a fictive intention and reason on the as-
sumption that contracting parties have had principally in mind what would happen if
the contract were not duly performed. It is probably better to have a judicial mind than
to be a kleptomaniac or an habitual drunkard, but this probably brings more trouble to
other people, even if such a turn of mind causes much joy to the man who has it."
Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The Business Man's Opinion, 83
U. PA. L. REV. 147, 150 nn. 6-9 (1934).
66 See R. DAVID, supra note 54, at 92-97, 106.
67 Arbitration Act, 1979, 2 Eliz. ch. 2.
's See Klein, supra note 61, at 198; Clark & Lange, Recent Changes in English
Arbitration Practice Widen Opportunities For More Effective International Arbitra-
tions, 35 Bus. LAw. 1621 (1980).
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according to the terms of their agreement, are thus hallmarks of arbi-
tration in Western countries. A third aspect of arbitration, namely, the
enforceability of agreements to submit future disputes regarding a spe-
cific contract to arbitration rather than simply specific existing disputes
has also gained wide acceptance since the nineteenth century. It is these
aspects of arbitration that allow the flexibility necessary to assure suffi-
cient sensitivity to the varying needs of business and the expectations of
the parties, while still insuring that arbitration can result in firm and
swift decisions. Arbitration thus resembles both conciliation and litiga-
tion, while not being identical to either one.
4.2. Tahkim in the Qurdn and the Sunna69
The history of tahkim in Islam took a markedly different course
from the history of arbitration in the West. In the fragmented, tribal
society of pre-Islamic Arabia, tahktm, unlike arbitration, was not an
alternative to an established judicial system. Rather, it was the only
means of dispute resolution short of war if direct negotiation and medi-
ation failed to achieve a settlement.70 Hakams, or arbitrators, were
therefore persons of considerable importance, although they did not
hold any political power as a rule."1 Most hakams were k~hins, or
soothsayers, whose opinions would invoke the appropriate deities and
would be couched in terms indicating they were revelations from
heaven.72 The general belief that hakams were divinely inspired was
extremely important in bringing pressure to bear on the parties to sub-
mit disputes to tahktm and to abide by the awards rendered. 73
The hakams, therefore, represented a threat to the prophet
Muhammad on two levels. First, they were rival expositors of the
Sunna, or customary law, which Muhammad hoped to reform and reg-
ularize in accordance with his new revelation.74 Second, they claimed
religious authority for themselves and their deities in competition with
the one God, Allah, whom Muhammad preached.7 5 Muhammad's task
was to unify the Arabs both politically and religiously; to become
6 See N. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1974); J. SCHACHT, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 6-22 (1964); E. TYAN, HISTORE DE L ORGANISATION
JUDICIARE EN PAYS DE L ISLAM 27-82 (2d ed. 1960).
10 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 359, 367-70 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny
eds. 1955) [hereinafter 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST].
71 See id. at 29; see also J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 7.
11 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 29; see also J. SCHACHT,
supra note 69, at 7-8.
'3 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 8.
74 See id. at 8; see also 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30-31.
75 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30.
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known, in a manner of speaking, as the hakam and the k-hin for a
unified nation of Islam, the sole valid expositor of the Sunna and the
sole recipient of divine revelation.
Thus, unlike the legal scholars of Rome and medieval Europe,
Muhammad was not at all interested in developing a dispute resolution
mechanism that was insulated from political control." On the contrary,
Muhammad needed to control the legal system and, through it, to con-
trol the development of the law itself.17 The Qur'an particularly
stresses the importance of Muhammad being named hakam in disputes
arising among the early Muslims and that the disputes would be de-
cided in accordance with God's law as revealed to Muhammad.78 The
Qur'-nic injunction that believers should be judged "by what God has
revealed" precluded the choice of any other law by the parties.79
Moreover, the very concept of a divinely-revealed law implied a
large potential for error with respect to human judgments. Even the
Prophet himself did not claim infallibility in this regard. A judgment
was binding only insofar as it accorded with God's law. 0 It would be
sinful for a Muslim to accept a judgment issued by another that he
believed to be contrary to law." Yet, as we have seen, the acceptance of
judgments that may be contrary to law is a fundamental characteristic
of what the Westerners call arbitration. Like choice of law, limited ju-
dicial review never became a part of the Muslim concept of tahkimr. 2
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that tahktm lost all of
its pre-Islamic characteristics after the rise of Islam, or that it took on
all of the characteristics that a Western lawyer would associate with a
regular court proceeding. Pre-Islamic tahkim was a voluntary proce-
dure that could be triggered only by the mutual consent of the parties
to the dispute and by their agreement on a specific individual to act as
76 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 10-12.
7 See id.
78 "Oh believers! Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who are
in authority, and if you have a dispute over anything refer it to God and the Prophet if
you believe in God and the last day. That is the best and fairest determination."
QUR'XN IV:59.
"We have sent you down the Book with the truth that you [Muhammad] may
judge between the people by what God has shown you." Id. IV:105.
"Judge between them by what God has revealed and follow not their vain
desires." Id. V:49.
" The QuR'XN attacks the hakams precisely because they failed to apply the
proper religious and legal principles: "Have you not seen that those who claim to be-
lieve what has been revealed to you and what has been revealed before you wish to go
for judgment to false gods, having been ordered to abjure them?" Id. IV:60.
8o See M. KHAN, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 6-9 (1978); see also J. SCHACHT,
supra note 69, at 189.
s See M. KHAN, supra note 80.
82 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAsT, supra note 70, at 259-63.
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hakam. 83 Muhammad did nothing to change this voluntary aspect of
tahkim.84 He much preferred to resolve disputes by proposing an ami-
cable settlement (sulh) rather than by imposing a judgment on an un-
willing party. 85 A settlement was a far more likely result where the
hakam was chosen by the parties than where he was imposed by some
outside authority.86 Early Islam, therefore, never developed a system
for the outside appointment of arbitrators, which is essential to enforce-
ment of any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration.
87
When the parties were unable to agree on a single person to act as
8S See, e.g., the account in SHAMS AL-DIN AL-SARAKHSI (Hanaff school, d.1090
A.D.), 1 SHARH AL-SIYAR AL-KABIR 363-66 (Hyderabad 1335 A.H.), of a tahkim
between the early Muslims, led by Muhammad, and a Jewish tribe that the Muslims
had besieged. This account is noteworthy because of the great stress placed on both
parties' acceptance of the hakam. According to the account the Jews agreed to name
Muhammad as hakam only on the condition that he refer the decision of the case to
another Muslim named Sa'd Ibn Ma'dh who had once been an ally of the Jews.
Despite initial agreement on this arrangement, the two parties nevertheless took solemn
oaths, first appointing Muhammad as hakam, then appointing Sa'd in his place. Even
after Sa'd rendered his decision, Muhammad formally ratified it, saying that it was in
accordance with his own opinion. AL-SARAKHSI explains these procedures as follows:
This is evidence that if they submit to the judgment of a [certain] man and
he refers judgment to a third person with their acceptance, then that is
lawful. He should not refer judgment to a third person without their ac-
ceptance because Sa'd, between the arms of the Prophet (Peace be upon
him), took from them the oath that they would accept [his judgment], and
the Prophet (Peace be upon him) did not object to that. This is because
people have differing opinions [regarding the law] and this is a judgment
that requires an opinion. So their acceptance of the judgment of one per-
son is not acceptance of the judgment of another, and if he refers judgment
to some one else without their consent and he judges in a certain way,
then that judgment should not be enforced unless the first hakam approves
it after he learns of it. Then it should be enforced because his approval
gives it the same status as if he made it [himself] and because the judgment
was in accordance with his opinion and they had accepted that.
Id. at 366.
" See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 30-31.
" Bukhiris SAHI (an early collection of traditions) includes a report of a dis-
pute between two landowners who used the same stream for irrigation. The plaintiff
had the legal right to exclusive use of the stream. The Prophet nevertheless suggested a
reconciliation whereby the defendant could have the use of any excess water not needed
for irrigation of plaintiff's land. Only when the defendant refused this compromise so-
lution did the prophet give judgment in accordance with plaintiff's legal right. 3 ABu
'ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD IBN ISMA'IL AL-BUKHARI, SAIH AL-BUKHARI bk. XLIX,
no. 871 (M. Khan trans. 1979).
Sulh gets far more elaborate treatment than tahkim both in the hadith literature
and in fiqh treatises that followed in later centuries. Bukhir!s SAHTH devotes an entire
chapter to sulh, which the Prophet apparently found a particularly appropriate method
for resolving financial disputes. See id. no. 869, 873; see also id. no. 868.
8 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 70, at 29.
See generally M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 231-38
(1955) (discussing the rise and fall of arbitration in relation to the development of
Islam).
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hakam, the general practice in the early Islamic community was for
each side to appoint one hakam.88 The two appointed hakams had to
agree on the final judgment. This was the practice used in the disas-
trous tahktm that occurred twenty-seven years after Muhammad's
death. The tahkim was an attempt to end the civil war between 'Al,
the fourth Caliph, and his rival Mu'-wiya, the governor of Syria."
Accounts of this event also provide a good illustration of the other as-
pect of pre-Islamic tahktm that has been discussed; the emphasis on
strict law as contained in the Qur'dn and the Sunna which provide
grounds to set aside a judgment."'
The dispute over the Caliphate was submitted to tahktm by a
written agreement appointing the two hakams. The agreement gave the
hakams full power to settle the dispute, but it contained an important
proviso; the decision had to be based on the Qur'an and the Sunna.9 '
The hakams agreed in private that both claimants be deposed and a
new Caliph be chosen by popular election. 2 'Alt's hakam announced
the decision first, but when Mu'-wiya's hakam followed, he said he
agreed that 'Alt should be deposed but affirmed Mu'[wiya's claim to
the Caliphate.93 'All quickly condemned the decision, charging that the
two hakams had "left the Qur'-n behind them. . . and that each one
had followed his own opinion without [taking into consideration] a
standard. Their decision [therefore] has no ground of evidence or prece-
dent; and [moreover] they have disagreed on their decision.
9 4
Thus, all of the principal aspects of early Islamic tahkim com-
bined to make the decision unenforceable. The requirement that the
parties agree on the choice of a hakam and the general emphasis on
compromise resulted in the appointment of two arbitrators, thereby re-
ducing the chance of reaching a firm decision on the dispute. It also
created an opportunity for Mu'-wiya's hakam to outwit 'Alt's hakam.
The decision was easily rejected on grounds that the arbitrators did not
comply with Shart'a. The failure of this tahktm caused innumerable
difficulties for the early Muslim community; it lead indirectly, after
S" The only passage in the QUR'XN that refers to tahkim by anyone except the
Prophet himself, which is also the only passage that talks about tahkim procedures,
shows the purpose of tahkim to be that of reaching a reconciliation between husband
and wife: "If you fear a breach between the two, send a hakam from his family and a
hakam from her family. If they wish a reconciliation, God will make them agree."
QUR'AN IV:35.
" See M. KHADDURI, supra note 87, at 234-38.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 235.
2 Id. at 236.
" Id. at 237.
94 Id.
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'Alt's assassination, to the great split between the followers of the
Sunna and the followers of the Sht'a, or party of 'All.
Mu'Nwiya went on to become the first Caliph of the new Urn-
mayad dynasty which established a new system of justice featuring
judges, or q-dts, with mandatory jurisdiction to hear disputes and the
authority to enforce and execute their judgments. 8 The importance of
tahktm greatly declined as a result. Furthermore, as discussed in the
next section,9" the voluntary character of tahktm increased because
there was now an alternative method of submitting a dispute to the
judgment of God and his Prophet.97 The enforcement of decisions made
by hakams became even more difficult, since they had to be reviewed by
qdts before being enforced.9" Therefore, tahktm became a very differ-
ent institution from arbitration as it is known in the West.
4.3. Tahkim in the Fully-Developed Islamic Legal System9"
In discussing the rules developed by the medieval scholars of fiqh
(jurisprudence) regarding tahktm, reference will be made to the doc-
trines of all four schools of law recognized by Sunnt, or orthodox, Is-
lam. 00 Although the Hanbat school is of primary importance in Saudi
Arabia, there is a tendency there, as in other Muslim countries that
apply the Sharta in whole or in part, for legislators and judges to
choose the legal principles from the doctrines of all four schools consid-
ered most appropriate to contemporary circumstances. 1O" A doctrine
recognized by one of the schools would never be considered heretical or
sinful by the other schools, even if they disagreed with it. Furthermore,
in discussing tahktim, scholars in each of the four schools tend to em-
phasize different aspects of the procedure, and thus it is really not pos-
sible to discuss tahktm fully by referring to the doctrine of only one
school. This section is intended to give the reader some sense of the
range of source material available to the Saudi government for formu-
lating arbitration rules that are consistent with the Shart'a, broadly
defined.
Tahktm is not discussed at all in many of the medieval Sharl'a
treatises. Where it is discussed, it is usually allotted only a short section
9 See id. at 242; see also J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 188-91.
See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
9 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 69, at 10-11, 24-27.
9' See id. at 189.
99 For an excellent, detailed account of tahkim in the fully developed Shari'a sys-
tem, see generally S. SALEH, supra note 4.
100 See supra note 4.
101 See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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in the chapter on judicial procedure (A1-Qad-'). Although authors fre-
quently drew analogies between tahkim and contract law, especially the
law of agency (wik-la), tahkim was not classified as part of the law of
contract.102 Shart'a scholars were very careful not to compromise or
modify either contractual or procedural doctrines in their discussion of
tahkim. The agreement to submit a dispute to tahkim had to follow the
same rules as an agency contract. The decision of a hakam had to mea-
sure up to the same standards as a q-di's judgment. The result was a
procedure which looks to a Western lawyer like conciliation up to a
certain point, where it then begins to resemble litigation.
The process commenced with the appointment of an arbitrator
(hakam or muhakkam) by the parties to an existing dispute. Agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes regarding a specified contract were
unknown in the Middle Ages and thus are not discussed in the Shari'a
texts. In the Shfi'i, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools, the appointment of
the hakam could be revoked by either party to the dispute or by the
hakam himself at any time up until he announced his decision.103 Ac-
cording to M liki texts, the hakam's appointment was irrevocable from
the time he was appointed.1 0 4 None of the schools recognized any
power in a third party, not even a q-di, to appoint a hakam who was
not accepted by both parties. Thus, even in the Maliki school, a hakam
who died or otherwise became unable or unfit to serve after being ap-
pointed could not be replaced except by mutual agreement of the
102 Agency, like other contracts recognized by the Shari'a, was governed by its
own specific rules that the parties had only a limited ability to modify. Agency and
partnership contracts created a special type of relationship that was neither binding
(lizim) nor void (bitil) but merely permissible (ji'iz). This meant that both parties had
a unilateral right to withdraw from the contract whenever they wished. In the Gulf
states, this aspect of agency agreements has created difficulties for foreigners doing bus-
iness in the area, who are often required to have a local agent (wakil). If the agent
withdraws, the foreign principal cannot legally continue to do business. Applied to
tahkim, the analogy with agency meant that the hakam, as agent of both parties, had
jurisdiction only so long as the parties agreed that he did, and so long as he himself
agreed to serve. Like any other agent, when he transacted the business that he was
hired to transact, in this case the rendering of a judgment that settled the dispute be-
tween the parties, his action was binding on his principal(s) if they had not revoked the
agency agreement. See N. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN GULF STATES: THE IS-
LAMIC LEGAL TRADITION 76-82 (1984). The analogy between tahkim and agency is
stressed in all of the medieval Arabic works cited in this section.
103 See, e.g., 5 MUHAMMAD IBN 'UMAN IBN 'ABIDIN (Hanafli school, d.1836),
HISHIYYAT RADD AL-MUHTAR 'ALA AL-DURR AL-MUKHT:AR 427-432 (1966) [here-
inafter IBN 'ABIDIN]; MUHi AL-DIN AIu ZAKARIYYA NAWAWI (Shafli school,
d.1277), MINHXJ AL-TALIBIN (E. Howard trans. 1914); 10 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN IBN
QUDXMA (Hanball school, d.1223), AL-MUGHNi (1969) [hereinafter IBN QUDXMA].
104 See, eg., BURHXN AL-DIN IBRAHIM IBN 'AL IBN FARHUN (Maliki school,
d.1397), TABSIRAT AL-HUKKAM F7 UsL AL-AQDIYYA nos. 43-44 (Cairo 1301 A.H.)
[hereinafter IBN FARHiIN].
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parties.
The problem of revocability of the hakam could be resolved by
having his appointment ratified by a qadi. The hakam would then be-
come the ng'ib, or representative, of the q-dl, who was himself a ng'ib
serving at the pleasure of the supreme executive and judicial authority,
the Sultan.10 5 This rule appears to be universal among all of the four
schools.106 It is at the root of the requirement in Article 5 of the Arbi-
tration Regulation of 1983107 and in the old Commercial Court Rules
on arbitration 0 8 that a judicial authority must ratify the appointment
of arbitrators. What this doctrine did not provide was a way for a court
or any other body to appoint a hakam not initially chosen by both par-
ties, or any other way to make tahkim compulsory prior to the appoint-
ment of a hakam.109 This being the case, a clause in a contract refer-
105 See the MAJALLA art. 1847 (C. Typer, D. Demetriades & I. Effendi trans.
1901). The Majalla is a nineteenth century Ottoman codification of commercial doc-
trines of the Hanafi School. For more information on the ability of the Qadi to delegate
his powers, see Tyan, Judicial Organization, in 1 LAw IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra
note 70, at 236-41.
106 See S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 43.
107 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 5.
'08 Royal Decree M/ll of 1328 A.H. (1962), amended by Royal Decree M/5 of
1389 A.H. (1969) & Royal Decree M/8 of 1393 A.H. (1973).
109 Shari'a sources do provide two exceptions to the rule that only the parties may
choose arbitrators. The first and most important of these is found in accounts of the
Mazalim, or grievances, procedure. This procedure was a direct application of the ab-
solute authority of the sovereign to right all wrongs. Ideally, grievances were to be
heard directly by the king, but the power was usually delegated to subordinates who
could act as a sort of "super" appellate court having power not only to review and
overturn judgments and other formal acts by qidis and administrative officials, but also
to look into all aspects of those officials' public and even private conduct, to determine
their worthiness and competence for their position. Mazalim powers could also be used
to enforce judgments against powerful persons that qidis were unable or unwilling to
enforce. Mazalim officials were never called qids, and were freed from nearly all
Shari'a rules of procedure and evidence. Unlike a qadl, an official exercising mazalim
powers could compel parties to submit to a procedure similar to tahkim, though it is
never called by that name in the sources. Rather, it is reported that a mazaim official,
after conducting an investigation of the dispute, could refer parties to "mediation"
(wasiata) by persons chosen by the official. Should mediation fail to result in an amica-
ble settlement (sulh), the case would be decided by a qidl also chosen by the mazialim
official. It is not clear whether the qadi could also be a mediator. ABE AL HASSAN AL-
MAWARDI, AL-AHK7M AL-SULTANIYYA 77 passim (1973); 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, supra note 70, at 266; see also id. at 263-69 (discussing mazilim as a type of
justice "superior" to the ordinary judiciary, whose authority emanated from the author-
ity of the sovereign, and who is not bound by positive law).
The second exception stems from the comparative latitude afforded by jurists of
the Hanbali school to freedom of contract in general and freedom of contract in terri-
tory not under Muslim control (Dar al-Harb) in particular. Contracts made under a
foreign law regulating transactions taking place substantially outside Muslim territory
(Dir al-Islam) should be recognized as valid under Hanball doctrine. 9 IBN QUDAMA,
supra note 103, at 245, 273; S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 89; A. ZAYDAN, AHKAM AL-
DHIMMIYYiN WA'L MUSTA'MININ Fi DAR AL-ISLAM 560-63 (1963). This doctrine
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ring future disputes to arbitration would seem to be unenforceable.110
In all of the schools, the parties' acceptance of a specific person or per-
sons to act as hakam appeared to be an essential aspect of tahkim, one
of the characteristics that defined the term. It is this very requirement
of submitting an agreement signed by both parties at the time the dis-
pute arises that calls into question the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes (arbitration clause) under the Regulation.""
could perhaps cause a Hanball court to honor an arbitration clause in such a contract.
The doctrine would probably not cause a court to enforce a foreign arbitral award
based on legal principles not consistent with the Sharl'a, since the award would be
considered an act of judicial sovereignty in contrast with the contractual character of
the arbitration clause. This identification of an arbitral award with the law of judg-
ments and an arbitration agreement with the law of contract would be consistent with
the Shari'a's basic approach to tahkim. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 89 n.19, 91-92, 320-
22.
110 A Lebanese commentator has cited other reasons why an arbitration clause
would be invalid under the Shari'a based on Sharl'a general hostility to agreements
dependent on unforseeable, future events. This hostility stems from QUR'XNiC prohibi-
tions of rib-' (usury) and maysir (gambling), which merged in the minds of the Shari'a
scholars to create a strong presumption against undue risk (gharar) in transactions.
Gharar was said to result from lack of knowledge of the subject matter of the contract,
its quality or quantity, the amount due in exchange, or the time payment or perform-
ance is due, which could lead to an undue profit for one party at the expense of the
other. This uncompensated profit was the evil thought to be at the root of the prohibi-
tions of rib-' and maysir. The longer contractual obligations continue into the future,
and the more conditional or indefinite they are, the greater the risk that one party will
not receive the value that he expected at the time the contract was made. The Shari'a
did not recognize an agreement in futuro, an agreement to agree, which is essentially
what an arbitration clause amounts to. Furthermore, the Shar'a did not recognize the
validity of contracts whose object or purpose was not in existence or at least capable of
being accomplished at the time of contracting. If the object or purpose of an arbitration
agreement is the settlement of a dispute, then the fact that there is no dispute would be
grounds for annulment of the contract, or at the very least would make the contract
revocable by either party. Finally, the Miliki and Hanbali schools flatly refuse to rec-
ognize the validity of a contract that is "suspended" (al 'aqd al-mawqffi haqqihi), in
other words, a contract that becomes enforceable only on the occurrence of some uncer-
tain, future event. Arbitration contracts are among the few contracts that cannot be
conditional, according to the Shafi'i and Hanafi schools. In other words, the terms of an
arbitration agreement are defined by law. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 48-50; see also N.
COULSON, supra note 102, at 44; IBN 'ABIDIN, supra note 103, at 428; IBN QUD7MA,
supra note 102, at 95; S. MAHMASSANI, AL-NAZARIYYA AL-'AMMA LI'L-M-JIBAT
WA'L-'UQUD Ri'L-SHARI'A AL-ISLAMIYYA 327-29 (1972).
The concern over uncertainty and lack of foreseeability also explains the revocabil-
ity of the permissible (a'iz) contracts of partnership and agency. Such contracts, though
necessary elements of an effective commercial system, are inherently uncertain because
they are especially dependent on continued personal contact and cooperation between
the parties. Thus, they could neither be considered void nor unconditionally binding
but as belonging in a special category. N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 76-82.
I Egyptian law on arbitration provides an ingenious, if problematic, solution.
Parties are required to name specific persons as arbitrators in the arbitration clause, in
advance of any dispute, and obtain their consent to serve. A court will then ratify the
arbitration clause. The problem is that if an arbitrator is unable to serve at the time a
dispute arises, or is disqualified, the arbitration collapses unless the parties can agree at
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The analogy between tahktm and agency is central to understand-
ing how the medieval Hanaff, Sh-fi'!, and Hanbali scholars viewed the
tahkim procedure. It seems clear that tahkim was intended to begin
with an attempt at conciliation (sulh), which due to its association with
religious generosity and forgiveness, was the preferred method of dis-
pute resolution. While attempting conciliation, it was apparently con-
sidered desirable for the hakam to be put on an equal or even inferior
level to the parties in order to force him to persuade rather than coerce
the parties and generally to maintain a cooperative and friendly atmo-
sphere conducive to an amicable settlement, the same atmosphere that
ought to be maintained between principal and agent.
Incentives to settle rather than litigate were built into the tahktm
system. Since an offense against the law was also an offense against
religion, the very idea that a person might have to be dragged into court
and forced to obey the law was shameful. Even a successful litigant
could suffer damage to his reputation.112 It was far preferable to settle,
perhaps on the basis of a private legal opinion from a mufti (legal
scholar), or to submit voluntarily to the judgment of a hakam. 11 It is a
general rule in all schools of the Shari'a as well as in the statute laws
of most modern Arab states that disputes that cannot be conciliated
cannot be arbitrated.11 4 Thus, the possibility of conciliation must al-
ways remain open in tahktm.
At some point during the tahkim procedure the hakam changed
from a conciliator whose actions were governed by the law of contract
to a judge whose decision had to comply with the rules of procedure,
evidence, and substantive law under the Sharl'a. The hakam therefore
had to have the qualifications of a q adt 1 5 There are seven such quali-
fications, the most important of which is that he be a Muslim, and
that time on the appointment of a replacement. S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 201 passim.
Note that Article 10 of the Regulation, allowing the Authority to appoint arbitrators, is
a clear departure from the Shari'a. Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 10.
112 See 4 IBN QUDXMA, supra note 103, at 358.
211 According to an Eqyptian scholar, both tahkim and ift?' (the practice of seek-
ing legal opinions) were intended to give parties an opportunity "to know the judgment
of the Sharia and adhere to its precepts obediently and voluntarily." M. MADKUR, AL-
QADX' il AL-ISL.M 131 (1965).
114 Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 2.
"I" This rule is universal, except among some very late Hanafi scholars. The
MAJALLA, for example does not state anywhere that a hakam has to be a Muslim. See
the MAJALLA, supra note 105. Hanbali sources insist that a hakam be "qualified to
give judgment [salih l'il-qad?']". See MANSOR IBN Y'UNUS AL-BUH-UTi (Hanbali
school, d. 1641); AL-BuHii, 6 KASHSHXF AL-QINA' 'AN MATN AL-IQNA' 308-09
(1968) [hereinafter AL-BUHri]; MUSTAFA IBN SA'D AL-SuYUiH (Hanbali school, d.
circa 18th c.), 6 MATLIB ULA AL-NUHA 1I SHARH GHXYAT AL-MUNTAHA (1961)
[hereinafter AL-SuYlr]; 10 IBN QUDX7MA, supra note 103, at 94.
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knowledgeable in the science of fiqh, or Sharl'a jurisprudence. 116 If all
parties to the dispute were non-Muslims these rules did not apply.
Non-Muslims residing permanently in Muslim territory (dhimmIs), or
travelling under a grant of safe conduct were permitted to administer
their own justice if the dispute was between parties of the same reli-
gion. If their religions differed, or if a Muslim party were involved,
application of the Sharl'a was mandatory."' Thus, if a Muslim was a
party to the dispute, it was not possible to arbitrate except in strict
law." 8 Choice of law between the Shari'a schools was possible by the
parties' agreement to choose a hakam from that particular school.
The areas of most serious conflict between Western and Islamic
concepts of arbitration concern the enforceability of a judgment reached
through tahktm and the standard of review applied. The differences
stem from the fundamental nature of law in Islam. The Shari'a, for a
devout Muslim, is something of a religious ideal, ultimately beyond the
comprehension of mortals. The Prophet expressed this attitude in a
well-known hadith:
I am only a man, and when you come pleading before me it
may happen that one of you might be more eloquent in his
pleadings and that as a result I adjudicate in his favor ac-
cording to this speech. If it so happens and I give an advan-
tage to one of you by granting him a thing which belongs to
his opponent, he had better not take it because I would be
giving him a portion of Hell.119
This remarkable statement brings out two important aspects of Islamic
Law. It underscores the fallibility of all human judgments when mea-
sured against a divinely revealed standard, while warning believers not
to act against their own consciences. A judgment may put an end to
litigation, but it does not change the essence of things. For a reviewing
court to enforce what it believed to be a serious violation or misinter-
pretation of the law would itself be sinful, equivalent to a successful
litigant taking advantage of a favorable judgment that he knows to be
unjust.2 o
"16 S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 35-38.
117 A. FATTAL, LE STATUT LGAL DES NONMUSULMANS EN PAYS D'ISLAM 344-
66 (1958); A. ZAYDAN, supra note 109, at 560; 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra
note 70, at 78-124.
11 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, Hakam 72 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter
ENCLYCLOPEDIA].
A IMXM MUSLIM, 3 SAHIH MUSLIM no. 4721 (A. Siddiqi trans. 1976).
120 Another well-known tradition warns against "making lawful what is unlaw-
ful" or "making unlawful what is lawful." (L'a- yuhill har'faman wa-li yuharrim
hatlian). See Tyan L'Autoritb de la Chose Jugbe en Droit Musulman, 1962 STUDIA
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The schools of law differed somewhat on the binding force of a
judgment reached through tahkim. A minority of Shafi't scholars held
that the final judgment had to be accepted by both parties before it
became binding on them, thus reducing tahktm to a purely conciliatory
procedure from beginning to end."' 1 Hanaff scholars held that a q~di
should not enforce a hakam's judgment unless he agreed with it.12 2 The
majority of the Shafi'! scholars as well as the M-liki and Hanbalt
schools were of the opinion that the decision of a hakam had the same
legal status as a q-di's judgment.1 28 The Hanballs are particularly in-
sistent on this point, stating that a qadi should not refuse enforcement
merely because of a difference of opinion (ikhtilaf al-r 'y).
1 21
This doctrine sounds rather encouraging from a Western stand-
point. However, it did not mean that any legal opinion expressed in a
hakam's judgment was binding on a q-dT. The deference afforded to a
hakam's opinion was no greater than would be afforded to the opinion
of another q-d. Such deference did not extend to a violation or misin-
terpretation of any rule stemming directly or by clear analogy (qiy~s
jall) from the primary sources of the Shari'a, the Qur'In, and the
Sunna, or any rule on which there was a consensus (Ijma') among the
four schools. Different views were expressed as to whether a judgment
could be revoked or annulled if a q-di or hakam disregarded a rule of
law on which there was a consensus within his own school, in favor of
a rule recognized by another school. In all cases, a qadt or hakam was
expected to be aware of any controversy, at least within his own school,
regarding a rule on which he was basing his judgment. If he failed to
cite an opinion contesting the rule he applied, the door would be left
open for a reviewing court to revoke or annul the judgment based on
such other opinion."'
These rules would seem to make these judgments of a q~di or
hakam extremely precarious. As a practical matter, however, since
there was no appellate court system as such in medieval Islamic society
and since a q-dt had the power to enforce his own judgments, most
were relatively stable.126 A hakam, however, had no power to enforce
ISLAMICA 81, 81-90.
121 SHAMS AL-DIN RAMLI (Shifi'l school, d. 1596 A.D.), 8 NIHXYAT AL-
MUHTJ 230-31 (Cairo 1356 A.H.) [hereinafter RAMLI]; S. SALEH, supra note 4, at
75; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 118, at 72.
122 IBN 'ABIDIN, supra note 103, at 431.
123 IBN FARHIUN, supra note 104, no. 44 (M"Qiki school); RAMLi, supra note 121
(Shifi'l school).
124 6 AL-BuifuTi, supra note 115, at 310; 6 AL-SuYTHi, supra note 115, at 472;
10 IBN QUDXMA, supra note 103, at 95.
125 M. MADKUR, supra note 113, at 57-61; see S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 75-82.
12I A qadi's decision would only be reviewed in four circumstances: (1) it could be
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his decision. The decision would therefore have to be reviewed by the
local q-d! if the parties did not comply with it voluntarily. As a general
rule, judgments could not be revoked or annulled because of a mere
error of fact.
1 7
In conclusion, the basic conceptual differences between arbitration
and tahkim may be summarized as follows. First, arbitration in the
West, although it begins with a contract, takes on many of the proce-
dural characteristics of a court proceeding in its earliest stages. In the
name of expediency, control by the parties over arbitration is limited
following their initial agreement to arbitrate.12 From then on, the pro-
cedure itself takes over, insuring that arbitrators will be appointed,
preferably but not necessarily by the parties, and that arbitration will
in fact take place unless both parties agree that it will not.12 Tahkim,
on the other hand, maintains a voluntary, conciliatory, and contractual
aspect. The continuing consent of the parties would ideally be main-
tained up to the last possible moment before the hakam renders his
decision. Thus, although certain procedures developed out of necessity
to insure that a hakam, once appointed, could have a chance to render a
decision, the idea of binding the parties to arbitrate a future dispute is
essentially foreign to the cooperative spirit tahkim was designed to
foster.
Second, though she has many of the powers of a judge, an arbitra-
tor is not bound by the same constraints as a judge. Because she neither
reviewed by the qidi who made it; (2) it could be reviewed by his successor in office;
(3) if enforcement were sought in another qidi's jurisdiction it could be reviewed by
that qdi; or (4) it could be appealed to the sovereign through the mazaim procedure.
See S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 75-82.
117 However, certain Miliki authors held that a judgment was reversible for an
error of fact leading to a flagrant injustice, especially if there was reason to suppose the
qidi or hakam had been unduly biased in favor of one party. There was no limit to the
grounds on which an official exercising mazialim powers might revoke or annul a judg-
ment. This was in keeping with the extraordinary nature of the mazalim jurisdiction,
which was considered a direct application of the authority of the sovereign, the source
of all judicial power exercised by the qi'dis. Id.
128 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th
Cir. 1973) (basic purpose of arbitration is speedy disposition of disputes without ex-
pense and delay of litigation); see also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUG-
GESTIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 9 (1928) ("The arbitrator is the judge of both fact and law. This means that
the decision and means of arriving at it are not subject to review by courts . . ").
129 Under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), if the parties
are unable to agree upon an arbitrator and have agreed upon no other method of choos-
ing one, the AAA will select one for them. See Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association § 12 (1973), reprinted in G. GOLDBERG, A LAW-
YER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 131 (1977); see also Global Maritime
Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S N. Breeze, 349 F. Supp. 779 (D.R.I. 1972) (arbitration
agreements are enforceable as any other contract).
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
derives her powers from the state nor adjudicates in the name of the
state, she is less interested in furthering the policies underlying state
laws than she is in the needs and expectations of the parties and of the
business community in general. She is considered particularly well-
qualified to determine those needs and expectations, and thus her deci-
sion is reviewable only on very narrow grounds.1 30 In contrast, when
the hakam makes a judgment he is establishing the rights and duties of
one party as against another under law which is the embodiment of
God's commands for the welfare and protection of His community. The
hakam's primary duty is to the law itself and to the Muslim commu-
nity, not to the inividual disputing parties. His function is therefore
essentially equivalent to that of a judge, and his decision is entitled to
no more deference than that of a judge.
At the root of the conceptual conflict between the two procedures
is the fact that Islamic Law never developed a distinction between law
and equity."3 ' If one believes that the law is divinely inspired, the very
idea that an alternative kind of justice exists that is more "just" in
certain cases than the law itself is untenable. Thus, disputes must be
resolved either by agreement among the parties or according to the law.
It is the end that determines the means used to achieve it. Therefore,
unlike arbitration, tahkim never developed an identity separate from
conciliation and litigation.
4.4. Significance of the Distinction Between Arbitration and Tahkim
Of what concern is this history to a foreigner trying to do business in
Saudi Arabia? The short answer is that the concerns of those who pro-
mulgate laws regulating business activities must also be the concerns of
the businesspersons themselves. The role of the Shari'a in Saudi law is
defined in the Organic Instructions of the Kingdom of Hij-z, which
have served as sort of an informal Saudi constitution since they were
promulgated by King 'Abd al 'Aziz in 1926:
Article Five. The administration of the Hij~zi Kingdom is in
the hands of His Majesty King 'Abd al 'Aziz the First Ibn
'30 See, e.g., Sterling Col. Beef Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Lo-
cal Union No. 7, 767 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1985) (review of arbitration award confined
to narrow question of whether it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement).
131 "Juristic speculation in classical times was not regarded as an independent
process which created a field of man-made law alongside the divine ordinances. It was
entirely subordinate to the divine will in the sense that its function was to seek the
comprehension and the implementation of the purposes of Allah for Muslim society."
N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 19.
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'Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa'Ud and His Majesty is
bound by the rules of the Sublime Shari'a.
Article Six. The [legal] judgments shall always be in accor-
dance with the Book of God, the Sunna of His Prophet and
what the companions and pious predecessors agreed upon.132
Article Six is noteworthy because of its emphasis on the Quran
and the Sunna and its limitation of the scope of Ijma' (consensus) to the
"companions and the pious predecessors," the latter term referring to
the earliest generations of Islam before the establishment of the schools
of law. This term implies some flexibility with regard to the binding
authority of the medieval legal texts, though the medieval texts have
unquestionably exerted a great deal of influence on the development of
law in Saudi Arabia.
Sheikh Yamani, the former Saudi minister of petroleum, drew a
distinction between two definitions of the Shari'a in his 1978 speech at
New York University.133 Broadly defined, the Shari'a consists of "eve-
rything written by Muslim jurists throughout the centuries," but has
no binding authority in and of itself because it operated under circum-
stances that are no longer in existence. Narrowly construed, "the
Shara is confined to the undoubted principles of the Qur'an, what is
true and valid of the Sunna, and the consensus of the community repre-
sented by its scholars and learned men during a certain period and
regarding a particular problem, provided there was such a consensus.
Viewed as such, the Shara has a binding authority on every Mus-
lim. .... ,134 Based on this distinction, Yamani argues in favor of a
broad legislative power for Muslim governments to "select principles
from the various juristic schools without bias . . . . Such countries can
then legislate new solutions for novel problems by deriving the solutions
from the general principles of the Shari'a and considerations of public
interest and communal welfare."" 5
This attitude is reflected to a somewhat lesser degree in the rules
governing Shari'a courts in Saudi Arabia. Judges are bound to apply
authoritative Hanbali texts, but are authorized to consult opinions from
the other schools and to apply them in circumstances where the
"32 The Organic Instructions of the Hiy'5z Kingdom pt. II, arts. 5, 6, translated
in S. SOLAiM, supra note 3, at 172.
1"I Yamani, The Eternal Shari'a, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 205 (1979)
(Remarks delivered by Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Re-
sources, Saudi Arabia, at the New York University School of Law, New York, Oct. 24,
1978).
134 Id. at 206.
135 Id.
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Hanbalf opinion would "cause strain and incompatibility with the pub-
lic interest [maslahat al-'umum]."' 86 Any such determination by a
judge would be appealable to a higher court and ultimately to the Judi-
cial Council and the King.
137
The existence of this legislative power to interpret the basic
sources of Shari'a afresh in light of modern circumstances explains a
great deal about the Regulation and Rules. Although the Regulation
and Rules are more comprehensive than anything in the Shari'a manu-
als, the fundamental characteristics of tahki-m that distinguish it from
arbitration are still present. Arbitration in Saudi Arabia is to be arbi-
tration in strict law. Arbitrators are required to meet Shari'a qualifica-
tions and to render awards that follow the substantive provisions of the
Shar'a and the applicable Saudi statutes. There are no express limita-
tions on the scope of judicial review to assure that these requirements
are met. As we have seen, these are requirements firmly grounded in
the Qur'dn and the Sunna, inherent in the very nature of a divinely
revealed, religious law, which recognizes the authority of no human
judgment. For a judge to ratify an award that he believes to contain a
serious violation or misinterpretation of that law, would, therefore, be
nothing less than sinful.
The provisions of the Regulation and Rules that seem most for-
eign to the Shart'a are the recognition of the validity of an arbitration
clause, and the Authority's power to appoint arbitrators."8 As we have
seen, these foreign elements are counterbalanced to some undetermined.
degree by the requirement that the parties submit a signed submission
agreement for validation by a judicial authority at the time a dispute
arises.'3 " This is clearly a vestige of the Shari'a rule that a q-di had to
approve the appointment of a hakam in order to make the appointment
irrevocable.1 4 ° However, colorable arguments based on Shai'a sources
can be made in favor of arbitration clauses and judicial appointment of
arbitrators.1 41 Provided that a hakam is competent and rules according
"so S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 96.
'37 See id. at 94.
1"8 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 1, 10.
139 Id. art. 5.
140 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
141 The mazalim procedure provided for judicial appointment of arbitrators with-
out the approval of either of the disputing parties, even though that power was ex-
traordinary not to mention discretionary, as opposed to the "shall appoint" language in
art. 10. See supra note 69. Governmental boards such as the CSCD are descendents of
the old mazilim tribunals. As for Shari'a courts, Mliki sources hold that qidis should
be able to exercise mazalim powers when political circumstances and the public interest
require it. Tyan, supra note 105, at 260-61.
Taqi al-Din Ab-u al-'Abb-s Ibn Tamiyya (d.1328) was a leading Hanbali advo-
cate of the same doctrine of "political law" or "lawful public policy" (Al-Siy-sa AI-
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to the Shari'a, it can be argued that the "risk" otherwise present in an
arbitration clause can be largely eliminated by court supervision. 42 A
court can insure at the beginning of the proceeding that a qualified
hakam has been chosen and can review his decision to insure compli-
ance with the Shari'a. The result should then be consistent with what a
judge would decide if there had been no tahktm. Even though such an
argument is novel, it is nevertheless consistent with Sheikh Yamani's
call for a fresh interpretation of the sources in light of modern political
realities.
Although Sheikh Yamani provides justification for a legislative re-
interpretation of the Shari'a, he does not provide a basis for allowing
any significant degree of deference to either judges or arbitrators. If
"considerations of public interest and communal welfare" are to be the
basis for reform, such considerations must ultimately be the province of
the central government, not of arbitrators who are primarily concerned
with the interest and welfare of the business community rather than
society as a whole and who may not even be Saudi citizens. 43
It is a difficult and controversial task to set the boundary line
where some current perception of the public interest becomes inconsis-
tent with fundamental principles stemming from the primary sources of
Islamic Law. This is one reason why Ibn Taymiyya's famous treatise
on political law, written in the early fourteenth century, stresses the
central role of consultation and consensus between religious and politi-
cal authorities.1 44 The rise of the House of Sa'd to dominance in what
is now Saudi Arabia began when they became allies of the seventeenth
century religious reformer 'Abd al-Wahh-b. Early in this century King
'Abd al-'Aztz exhibited considerable skill in taking disparate points of
view into account and slowly building a consensus around the need for
reform and modernization. Though the process may seem slow to for-
eigners, Saudi Arabia has come a long way since 1927, when 'Abd al-
'Aziz and the 'Ulama' clashed over the legality of the wireless transmit-
ter under the Shari'a1
45
Arbitration represents a potential threat to this slow process of
consensus-building because it may lead to an uncontrolled and haphaz-
ard introduction of foreign business customs and legal principles that
Shar'iyya) which the M'likis used to justify the exercise of such powers. AL-SIYASA
AL-SHAR'IYYA 182-83 (A. Farrukh trans. 1966) (PUBLIC POLICY IN JURISPRUDENCE)
[hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY].
Regarding the concept of risk (gharar), see supra note 110.
'4 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144 PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 141, at 182-83.
145 S. SOLAIM, supra note 3, at 159-170.
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could cause confusion and resentment among Saudis.""6 The Saudi re-
action to the ARAMCO case 147 indicates that the Saudis have little con-
fidence in the ability of foreigners, especially non-Muslims, to apply
correctly the Shari'a and to identify the real differences between it and
the general (mostly Western) principles of international commercial
law. This view has been reinforced since then by the reluctance of arbi-
trators in ICC arbitrations to attempt to apply Saudi law even where
the contract mandates its application and has been executed and per-
formed in Saudi Arabia.L
48
Arbitration, as it is understood and practiced in the West, is thus a
suspect and dangerous institution from the point of view of the Saudi
government, because it threatens the government's control over the pace
of change, a key factor in the country's political stability. Interestingly,
there is a parallel between this concern of the Saudi government to
maintain control over changes in their legal system and that of
Muhammad during the earliest days of Islam, when he denounced the
pagan hakams as a threat to the establishment of a new, unified legal
and religious doctrine.
With all this in mind, the advantages and disadvantages of arbitra-
tion in Saudi Arabia can be grouped according to the rationales em-
ployed by businesspersons who resort to arbitration in other
countries. 149
(1) Improving the administration of justice: Arbitration may or
may not be quicker and cheaper than litigation in Saudi Arabia. There
has always been strong pressure in the business community in favor of
voluntary compliance with arbitration awards, and that pressure can
only increase now that the Saudi government has promulgated rules
that give a new legitimacy to arbitration. The Saudis hope that arbitra-
tion can help reduce the caseload of the CSCD, thereby making both
litigation and the review of arbitration awards faster.150 If the CSCD
146 An historical precedent may be found in the granting of judicial privileges to
European and American nationals by the Ottoman Empire under the so-called "Capit-
ulations." Although initially intended only to allow the application of foreign law in
disputes among foreigners, the Capitulations eventually led to widespread abuse involv-
ing the application of foreign laws to disputes involving Muslim citizens of the Empire.
These abuses caused considerable resentment, and were a factor in the weakening of
the Empire. Liebesny, The Development of Western Judicial Privileges, 1 LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 69, at 309, 312-15, 327-28.
147 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963); see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
148 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 13, at 197-99.
149 See supra text accompanying note 60.
150 If the Chambers of Commerce and Industry ("the Chambers") can be an ap-
pointing authority under the new rules, this will further relieve the problems of the
CSCD. There seems to be no reason why parties cannot "otherwise agree" to have the
Chambers appoint arbitrators under the provisions of Article 10. See Royal Decree M/
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remains overloaded, however, this cannot help but affect the speed at
which requests for enforcement of, and objections against, arbitral
awards can be decided. As noted earlier, a party that wishes to take
advantage of as many opportunities for delay as possible would find
ample opportunities in the numerous possible referrals to the Authority
possible under the new rules. Finally, a degree of unpredictability is
present because of the lack of any defined standards for judicial review
of awards. There will frequently be no way of predicting whether a
magistrate reviewing an award will decide that an arbitrator has vio-
lated and misinterpreted a rule of law stemming from the Quran, the
Sunna, or Ijma', if that is indeed the standard, because the application
of such rules to contemporary commercial problems is simply not
clear."" Thus, parties will have to worry about being sent back to
square one with nothing to show for going through an entire arbitra-
tion proceeding, especially if some unusual or novel form of contract is
at issue.
(2) The search for another justice: Arbitrators chosen will no
doubt frequently be Western-educated Muslims familiar with the con-
cerns of foreign businesspersons. However, these arbitrators will have
less discretion than arbitrators in other countries to decide according to
their own notions of what is in the best interest of the business commu-
nity. Arbitration in Saudi Arabia may have some marginal value in
bringing areas of Islamic law, where differences may be found in the
source material, into line with prevailing business practices. However,
arbitrators will always have to keep in mind that their decisions must
be acceptable to the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute
and to the Authority's idea of what is best for the general welfare,
which may be based as much on political as legal concerns.
Thus, to the extent a businessperson is satisfied with the way judi-
cial authorities decide disputes in Saudi Arabia, he will be equally sat-
isfied with the way arbitrators decide them. To the extent he is dissatis-
fied with the Saudi judiciary, arbitration is not likely to give him a
great deal more satisfaction. The same inconsistencies between Western
and Saudi law regarding creditor's rights, interest payments, insurance
46, supra note 21, art. 10. However, it is hard to see how the Chambers, which is not a
judicial body and has no enforcement powers of its own, can have any final authority to
review arbitral awards. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
151 See N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 107. Because the scope and interaction of
Islamic and Western commercial law principles have in no way as yet been fully elabo-
rated or consistently defined in Saudi Arabia, it is futile to suppose that any certitude
exists at the moment as to what exactly Islamic commercial law is. "There is no real
law as such, but only law in the making: the state of flux and speculation must be
frankly recognized." Id.
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and maintenance agreements,152 the same ambiguities with regard to
copyrights and patents,515 and the contemporary application of the
traditional Islamic philosophy that a party whose legitimate expecta-
tions are frustrated by unforeseen events may withdraw from a con-
tract,1' " will likely continue to exist whether Saudi law is applied by a
judge or an arbitrator.
(3) The search for conciliation: Contract law in Islam does con-
tain a number of doctrines that a Western lawyer would classify as
"equitable," although Islamic law would not distinguish them from any
other contract law doctrines. One of these is that losses due to unfore-
seen events be born equally by the contracting parties.1 5 Other equita-
ble doctrines are clearly not recognized. For example, damages could
never include lost profits because these are inherently uncertain. 56 In
general, parties should expect no more equity from an arbitrator than a
court would be willing to provide.
(4) Resolution of disputes not within the jurisdiction of the courts:
An arbitrator, like a judge, might have authority to modify a contract
in response to unforeseen circumstances. However, a contract that in-
sufficiently outlines the rights and duties of the parties in advance
would run the risk of being declared void for vagueness and uncertainty
either by an arbitrator or a reviewing court.
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia is therefore likely to suffer from the
unpredictability and ambiguity that afflict Saudi law in general. As one
commentator puts it: "it is futile to suppose that any certitude exists at
the moment as to what exactly Islamic commercial law is. There is no
152 See Saba, supra note 2, at 19. "There is no clear right to repossess if a buyer
or lessee defaults and no clear definition of liability or enforceability of insurance and
maintenance obligations [under Saudi law]." Id.; see also N. COULSON, supra note
102, at 94-99. Instead of earning interest on their money, lender in Saudi Arabia make,
or intend to make, their profit from participation in commercial ventures. This practice
is undertaken to avoid the QuR'XNIC injunction against rib?' or "usury," and broad
notions of illicit gain or unjustified profit.
15I Saba, supra note 2, at 19. In Saudi Arabia, "[platent laws do not exist and
copyrights are virtually unenforceable." Id.
15 See N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 82-93. "A brief summary, therefore, of
the traditional Shari'a doctrine of frustration is that virtually any supervening circum-
stances which were unforeseen by the contracting party at the time of agreement and
which render performance more difficult and burdensome than contemplated allow that
contracting party who established the fact of such 'damage' to rescind the contract. The
emphasis is upon the maxim of 'no fair loss' in the performance of contractual obliga-
tions." Id. at 86.
155 See id. at 90. Coulson observed that Iraq civil courts when applying their civil
code to contracts frustrated by unforeseen events would "split the loss equally between
contracting parties. 'Equity is equality' is a maxim deep-rooted in Islamic legal tradi-
tion." Id. This theme, as applied to partnerships, is explored at length in IBN
TAYMIYYA, AL-MAZaLIM AL-MUSHTARAKA (1972).
154 N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 82.
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real law as such, but only law in the making: the state of flux and
speculation must be frankly recognized.
'1 57
5. AMICABLE COMPOSrrION AND SULH
Article 16 of the Regulation""8 has attracted little attention either
in the Rules or from commentators, but it provides an arbitration pro-
cedure that could avoid some of the unpredictability inherent in the
application of Saudi commercial law. It could also result in awards that
are easier to enforce than those reached through arbitration in strict
law. It appears to be analagous to the tahkim procedure described in
the Qur'an for settlement of marriage disputes by two hakams, one
appointed by the husband's family and one by the wife's, authorized to
reach a compromise settlement.159
This same procedure is applied to commercial disputes in a code of
Hanafi commercial law called the Majalla, published by the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century. 160 Each party appoints an agent
(Wakil) with power to settle the dispute. Any decision reached by the
two agents is binding on their principals." 1 In contrast with the wide
range of legal objections possible against an award reached through
regular tahkim procedures, authorized commentators on the Majalla
cite only two grounds on which a reviewing court can overturn a settle-
ment resulting from this sulh procedure: (1) when it appears subse-
quently that the money paid by a party to a sulh agreement was not
due; and (2) when the settlement concerns a claim that goods subject to
a contract of sale are defective, and the goods subsequently prove not to
be defective."" It should be noted that these grounds are factual, rather
than legal, in nature.
The Hanball school also recognizes that a party may appoint an
agent to conclude a settlement with another party, and that the settle-
ment agreed to by the agent is binding on his principal.163 Therefore,
there is no reason why the procedure outlined in the Majalla would not
also be possible in the Hanbai school. Article 16 of the Regulation
appears expressly to adopt it, stating that arbitrators may be authorized
to conciliate (mufawwadin bi'l-Sulh), in which case their decision must
167 Id. at 107.
I'l Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16.
159 See supra note 88.
160 See the MAJALLA, supra note 105, art. 1847.
161 Id. art. 1556.
162 S. SALEH, supra note 4, at 81-82.
163 4 IBN QUDXMA, supra note 103, at 359-60.
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be unanimous.'" Apparently Article 4, mandating that an uneven
number of arbitrators be appointed,'65 would still be applicable. The
extra arbitrator would presumably act as a mediator to help the two
party-appointed arbitrators reach an agreement. If he failed to do so,
the panel could then proceed to decide the case in strict law by majority
vote."6" Since Article 16 consistently refers to arbitrators in the plural,
it seems that the parties could not authorize a sole arbitrator to
conciliate.
167
Based on Hanbali statements regarding sulh,168 a settlement
reached through this procedure would be more difficult to attack on
appeal than would an award reached through arbitration in strict law.
The former would be treated as if it were a binding (L-zim) contract
agreed to by both parties, while the latter would be treated like a judg-
ment. 6 9 While a judgment establishes the rights and duties of the par-
ties under their original contract, and can be attacked on the basis that
it misinterpreted that contract,17 ° a settlement constitutes a new con-
tract to be judged as valid or invalid on its own merits.171 Thus, a
settlement is valid as long as it does not require the parties to do some-
thing they could not have contracted to do themselves. There is thus no
need to establish what the rights and duties of the parties in fact were
under the contract they actually signed.
172
This procedure, which appears to have much in common with the
Roman law concept of amicable composition,17 1 might prove very useful
in long-term leasing, supply, maintenance, and service contracts, which
I" See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16.
165 Id. art. 4; see also Van den Berg, supra note 14, at 22. "The requirement of
an uneven number of arbitrators [in Article 4] deviates from the method set forth in the
Labor and Workman Law of 1969 which provides for two arbitrators and an umpire."
Id.
16 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, arts. 4, 16; see also Van den Berg,
supra note 14, at 28. The expression "authorized to reach a compromise solution" in
Article 16 means that the arbitrators act as conciliators and give a binding decision with
the concurrence of the parties. This is why there must be unanimity in this case. With-
out the authority to compromise or with an inability to be unanimous, arbitrators will
reach a majority decision based upon strict law; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 118, at 72
(appointment of odd number of arbitrators).
167 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 16; see also Van den Berg, supra
note 14, at 22. "Although the appointment of a sole arbitrator (usually a Saudi lawyer)
by mutual agreement of the parties enjoys popularity, the most common method of
appointing arbitrators is that each party appoints an arbitrator and that the two so
nominated appoint a third arbitrator who is the presiding arbitrator." Id.
1" See 4 IBN QUDXMA, supra note 103, at 357 passim.
169 Id.
17O Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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the Sharl'a would classify under the general heading of hire (Ij-dra),
which includes disputes which arise out of unanticipated needs and
costs, and disagreements over the quality of services or equipment sup-
plied. In such disputes, some sort of modification of contractual terms
to respond to changed circumstances may be preferable to finding de-
fault, which is likely to end the business relationship between the par-
ties. It is these long-term contracts that are the most difficult to enforce
under Saudi law because of their uncertainty and inherent risk. If the
parties to these long-term contracts want to continue to do business
with one another, sulh may be a far better method of repairing their
relationship than either arbitration or litigation. An American business-
man speaking at a recent symposium on arbitration and conciliation in
the Middle East advocated just such a procedure:
My own feeling is that one should try to reach a settlement
without arbitration or without litigation.
In order to do this, it is sometimes necessary to try to elimi-
nate those people whose egos have been involved in the exe-
cution of the contract, bringing in some new people from
both sides who might be a little more unbiased about reach-
ing a settlement.
I have found that when you go to arbitration there are in-
flated claims and counterclaims and finally, if a settlement is
reached before the tribunal rules, the settlement is about
what could have been negotiated in the first place.174
Most important, sulh is an unquestionably Islamic institution, the
Prophet's preferred method of dispute resolution.'7 5 There is considera-
ble pressure today in Saudi Arabia to reach and abide by amicable
settlements. 76 Indeed, the main value of tahkim, in the minds of the
medieval Sharl'a scholars, was probably that it would likely produce a
settlement of the dispute rather than a judgment."' That value, it is
submitted, is why the procedure was supposed to remain voluntary un-
til the hakam reached his decision, according to the doctrine of three of
the four schools. The possibility of judgment, whether by the hakam or
a qadi, or both, was left open mainly to spur the parties to reach an
agreed settlement. It may have been considered desirable for a hakam's
judgment to be difficult to enforce, because this would constitute added
174 M. BROOKS, PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON U.S.-ARAB COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION 40 (1984).
175 See id.
176 Id.
177 Id.; see also N. COULSON, supra note 102, at 87.
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incentive for the parties to settle.
Sulh will certainly not be an appropriate procedure in all cases.
Where there has been a complete failure to perform the contract, or
where one party has not acted in good faith, there is no business rela-
tionship to maintain and proceedings aimed at reaching a settlement
would constitute merely another opportunity for the defendant to delay
the ultimate resolution of the dispute. Similarly, where the positions of
the parties are very far apart, it will not likely be possible to find any
solution on which all the arbitrators can agree.
The decision whether to authorize the arbitrators to conciliate
under Article 16 should therefore not be made in the arbitration clause,
but after the dispute arises, based on the parties' assessment of whether
a compromise would be an appropriate or feasible solution to the dis-
pute. Nonetheless, counsel for foreign companies should keep in mind
that sulh is the most Islamic, least controversial means of dispute reso-
lution in Saudi Arabia. Although it may preclude total victory, the re-
sult is likely to be agreeable to both parties. The procedure outlined in
Article 16 of the Regulation should, therefore, attract more interest
than it has thus far. The Saudi government should be urged to issue
rules to define more completely the consequences of authorizing arbi-
trators to conciliate.
6. CONCLUSION
Increased use of procedures that are drawn from the rich legacy of
Sharia scholarship is likely to be a far more effective way of helping
the Saudi legal system develop in ways acceptable to foreign business
people than are continued attempts to pressure the Saudi government to
adopt laws that are essentially foreign. Rather than pushing for rules
that limit the scope of court review of arbitration awards, Western law-
yers should be aware that a procedure already exists for doing so in
appropriate cases.
In general, the Arbitration Regulation of 1983178 will be a success
if those who utilize its procedures do not try to make it into a vehicle
for wholesale change. Awards that pay only lip service to the Shara
will likely be overturned by judicial authorities, resulting in a great
deal of frustration on all sides. Skillful arbitrators and parties percep-
tive enough to choose the appropriate procedure (and the appropriate
arbitrator) for the case, can play an important role in the slow process
of discovering a workable application of the Shari'a to the commercial
realities of the twentieth century.
178 See Royal Decree M/46, supra note 21, art. 1.
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ARBITRATION REGULATION OF SAUDI ARABIA
Royal Decree M/46 of 12.07.1403H (25.04.1983G)
Article 1
The parties may agree to arbitrate a specific existing dispute; a
prior agreement may also be made in respect of any dispute resulting
from the performance of a specific contract.
Article 2
Arbitration shall not be permitted in cases where a settlement
(Arabic: SULH) is not allowed. An agreement to arbitrate (Arabic: AL-
ITrIFAQ 'ALA AL-TAHKIM) may not be made except by those who have
capacity to act.
Article 3
Government Agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for
settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having ob-
tained the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers. This
ruling may be amended by resolution of the Council of Ministers.
Article 4
The arbitrator shall have expertise and be of good conduct and
behavior, and shall have full legal capacity. If there are several arbitra-
tors, their number shall be uneven.
Article 5
The parties to the dispute shall file the arbitration instrument
(Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM) with the Authority originally compe-
tent to hear the dispute. The instrument shall be signed by the parties
or their authorized attorneys, and by the arbitrators, and it must state
the details of the dispute, the names of the arbitrators and their accept-
ance to hear the dispute. Copies of the documents relating to the dis-
pute shall be attached.
Article 6
The Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall rec-
ord the applications for arbitration submitted to it, and take a decision
approving the arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM).
Article 7
If the parties have agreed to arbitrate before the occurrence of the
dispute, or if the arbitration instrument relating to a specific existing
dispute has been approved, then the subject matter of the dispute shall
be heard only according to the provisions of this Regulation.
Article 8
The clerk of the Authority originally competent to hear the dis-
pute shall be in charge of all the notifications and notices provided for
in this Regulation.
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Article 9
The arbitrator's decision shall be taken within the time limit spec-
ified in the arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKTIM),
unless it is agreed to extend it. If the parties have not fixed in the
arbitration instrument a time limit for the decision, the arbitrators shall
take their decision within ninety days from the date on which the arbi-
tration instrument was approved; otherwise any of the parties may, if
he so desires, appeal to the Authority originally competent to hear the
dispute which shall decide either hearing the subject matter or ex-
tending the time limit for another period.
Article 10
If the parties have not appointed the arbitrators, or if either of
them fails to appoint his arbitrator(s), or if one or more of the arbitra-
tors refuses to assume his task or withdraws, or something prevents him
from carrying out his tasks, or if he is dismissed, and there is no special
agreement between the parties, the Authority originally competent to
hear the dispute shall appoint the required arbitrators upon the request
of the party who is interested in expediting the arbitration, in the pres-
ence of the other party or in his absence after being summoned to a
meeting to be held for this purpose. The Authority shall appoint as
many arbitrators as are necessary to complete the total number of arbi-
trators agreed to by the parties; the decision taken in this respect shall
be final.
Article 11
The arbitrator may not be removed except with the mutual con-
sent of the parties, and the arbitrator so removed may claim compensa-
tion if he had already proceeded and if he had not been the cause of
such removal. Furthermore, he cannot be removed except for reasons
that occur or appear after the filing of the arbitration instrument
(Arabic: WATIIQAT AL-TAHIM).
Article 12
The arbitrator may be challenged for the same reasons for which a
judge may be challenged. The request for challenge shall be submitted
to the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute within five
days from the day on which the party was notified of the appointment
of the arbitrator, or the day on which one of the reasons for challenge
appeared or occurred. The decision on the request for challenge shall
be taken in a meeting to be held for this purpose and attended by the
parties and the arbitrator whose challenge is requested.
Article 13
The arbitration shall not terminate because of the death of one of
the parties, but the time fixed for the award shall be extended by thirty
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days unless the arbitrators decide on a further extension.
Article 14
If an arbitrator is appointed in place of the removed arbitrator or
the one who has withdrawn, the date fixed for the award shall be ex-
tended by thirty days.
Article 15
The arbitrators, by the majority by which the award shall be
made, may, through a justified decision, extend the periods fixed for the
award on account of circumstances pertaining to the subject matter of
the dispute.
Article 16
The decision of the arbitrators shall be taken by a majority vote
and if they are authorized to reach a compromise solution (Arabic:
SULH), their decision shall be by unanimity.
Article 17
The award document shall especially include the arbitration in-
strument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM), a resume of the depositions
of the parties and their documents, reasons for the award and its text
and date, and the signatures of the arbitrators. If one or more of them
refuse to sign the award, such refusal shall be stated in the award
document.
Article 18
All awards issued by the arbitrators, even if they are issued in
relation to one of the procedures of investigation, shall be filed within
five days with the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute
and the parties shall be notified by copies of them. The parties may
submit their objections against what is issued by the arbitrators to the
Authority with whom the awards were filed, within fifteen days from
the date on which they were notified of the arbitrators' awards; other-
wise such awards shall be final.
Article 19
If the parties or one of them submitted an objection against the
award of the arbitrators within the period provided for in the preceding
Article, the Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall
consider the dispute and shall either dismiss the objection and issue an
order for execution of the award, or accept the objection and decide the
case.
Article 20
The award of the arbitrators shall be due for execution, when it
becomes final, by an order from the Authority originally competent to
hear the dispute. This order shall be issued upon request of one of the
concerned parties after confirming that there is nothing to prevent its
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execution legally.
Article 21
The award made by the arbitrators shall be considered, after issu-
ance of the order or execution in accordance with the previous Article,
as effective as a judgment made by the Authority which issued the or-
der of execution.
Article 22
Fees of the arbitrators shall be determined by agreement between
the parties and unpaid sums of such fees shall be deposited with the
Authority originally competent to hear the dispute within five days af-
ter approval of the arbitration instrument (Arabic: WATHIQAT AL-
TAHki-M), and shall be paid within a week from the date on which the
order for execution of award is issued.
Article 23
If there is no agreement of the fees of the arbitrators, and a dis-
pute ensues, the matter shall be settled by the Authority originally com-
petent to hear the dispute, which decision shall be final.
Article 24
The decisions required for the execution of this Regulation shall
be issued by the President of the Council of Ministers, on the basis of a
proposal made by the Minister of Justice after agreement with the
Minister of Commerce and the President of the Board of Grievances.
Article 25
This Regulation shall be published in the Official Gazette; and
shall be effective thirty days after the date of its publication.
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS
ALLAH: God.
BATIL: null and void.
DXR AL-HARB: Lit. "Territory of War." Territory under control of
non-Muslims.
DHIMMI: A non-Muslim residing permanently in a Muslim country
under the protection of the Muslim government.
FATWA: A legal opinion given by a legal advisor, or MUFTI.
FIQH: The science of SHARI'A jurisprudence.
GHARAR: Risk of uncompensated loss to one party to a contract and
corresponding gain to the other due to uncertainty of contractual obli-
gations or unforeseen circumstances.
HADITH: An anecdote recording an action or statement of the Prophet,
his companions (SAHABA) or immediate successors (TAB'IUN). A
HADITH consists of an account of the action or statement (MATN) and a
list of names of the persons who transmitted orally up to the time it
was first recorded in writing (IsNXD), ending with the name of an eye-
witness to the event or statement.
HAKAM: Arbitrator.
IJXRA: Hire or lease. Generally, any contract transferring the use and
benefit of an object or person for a limited period of time for
consideration.
IjMX': Consensus of scholars and leading men of a certain past epoch
regarding a point of law. One of the four main sources of Islamic juris-
prudence (USUL AL-FIQH).
IKHTILAF AL-RA'Y: A difference of opinion regarding a point of law on
which there is no consensus among the four schools.
jA'IZ: Permissable. An adjective applied to contracts of license such as
agency or partnership that were revocable at any time by either party.
KAHIN: A soothsayer.
LAZIM: Binding, enforceable.
MADHHAB: Opinion or school of law.
MAJALLA, the: A code of commercial law published by the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century based on the teachings of the Hanafi
1987]
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school.
MASLAHAT AL-'UMUM: The public welfare.
MAYSIR: A game of chance played in pre-Islamic Arabia outlawed by
the Prophet. Gambling in general.
MAZALIM: P1. of MAZLAMA, a grievance or injustice. Refers to a special
legal procedure invoking the direct authority of the sovereign to review
all judgments and right all wrongs without being bound by SHARI'A
rules of procedure or evidence.
MUFAWWADIN BI'L SULH: Persons appointed by the parties to a dispute
authorized to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute.
MUFTI: A legal advisor authorized to issue FATWAS.
MUHAKKAM: An arbitrator, synonymous with HAKAM.
NA'IB: A representative, delegate, or deputy.
AL-QADX': Judicial procedure, the administration of justice.
QXDi: A judge, magistrate.
QIYXS: Analogy, one of the four main sources of the SHARV'A.
QUR'XN: The Holy Book of Islam, believed to be authored by God
Himself. The most important source of Islamic jurisprudence.
RIBA': Usury, interest.
SHAR'AN: According to SHARV'A.
SHARV'A: Literally, "a dear path to water." Islamic Law as derived
from the QUR'XN and the SUNNA of the Prophet through IJMX', QIYXs
and the public interest considerations. It purports to regulate all aspects
of the life of a devout Muslim.
SHi'A: Literally, a party, faction, or sect. Refers to the party of Ali, the
fourth Khalif, to whom the SHi'! sect traces its origin, and to whose
descendants SHi'! Muslims attach special importance.
SULH: Amicable settlement, conciliation.
SULTXN: The sovereign of the Muslim state.
SUNNA: Practice. The SUNNA of the Prophet is one of the four main
sources of Islamic Law. The SUNNA of his companions and immediate
successors, where they agreed, constitutes the most binding form of
IJM'.
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SUNNI: Pertaining to orthodox Islam, as opposed to, for example, the
SHVI sect. The schools of law discussed in this paper are those accepted
by all orthodox, SUNN Muslims, who consider that all four schools
provide acceptable interpretations of the SHARI'A.
TAHKIM: Arbitration.
WAKIL: Agent.
WASATA: Mediation.
WATHIQAT AL-TAHKIM: Arbitration instrument or document. An
agreement to submit a specific existing dispute to Arbitration under the
1983 Saudi Arbitration Regulation.
WIKALA: Agency.
'ULAMA': Pl. of 'XLIM, wise man, expert, scientist. Refers here to legal
and religious scholars of the SHARI'A.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
